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PRESERVING THE PRESUMPTION OF PATENT
VALIDITY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO OUTSOURCING
THE U.S. PATENT EXAMINER'S PRIOR ART
SEARCH
John A. Jeffery'
The United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) performs a
rigorous examination before issuing each patent.' During this process,
USPTO patent examiners analyze the claimed subject matter of the
invention, determine the scope and content of the prior art, and
ultimately decide whether the claimed invention is patentable.2 This
process requires each examiner to search and retrieve documents on
which to base the patentability decision.
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1. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2002).
2. See Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on Issues Related to the
Identification of Prior Art During the Examination of a Patent Application, 64 Fed. Reg.
28,803, 28,804 (May 27, 1999) [hereinafter USPTO Public Hearing on Prior Art].
3. Id. According to the USPTO:
Patent examiners can readily search classified paper files, microfilm, and CD-
ROMs, comprising United States patents, foreign patent documents, Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) publications, as well as a large selection of nonpatent
literature, including technical journals, books, magazines, encyclopedias, product
catalogues, and industry newsletters. In addition, patent examiners have access
to hundreds of in-house and commercial online databases providing convenient
access, from their desktop, to millions of United States and foreign patent and
nonpatent literature documents.
Id.; see also Lisa Fried, Q & A: PTO Chief- Q. Todd Dickinson Talks About Changes in
the Office, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 23, 2000, at 5 (quoting then-USPTO Director Q. Todd
Dickinson who stated that in 2000 examiners had "access to over 900 databases," which
provided better access to prior art than ever before).
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Examiners have conducted prior art searches as part of the
examination process for over 165 years.4 The USPTO, however, has
recently made an unprecedented proposal to outsource prior art searches
to commercial vendors in The 21st Century Strategic Plan (Strategic
Plan).' Many in the intellectual property community are concerned that
outsourcing prior art searches is not in the public interest and is
6detrimental to the patent system. In fact, some critics have
4. See Nancy J. Linck et al., A New Patent Examination System for the New
Millennium, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 305, 306-07 (1998) (noting that as of 1998, the U.S. patent
examination system, in which "patent applications have been examined for novelty,
usefulness, and inventiveness," served the nation well for over 160 years).
5. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO), THE 21ST CENTURY
STRATEGIC PLAN 13 (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/coml
strat21/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf (last modified Apr. 3, 2003). Initially, the Strategic Plan
called for the applicant to select the contractor. However, under the revised Strategic
Plan, the USPTO selects the contractor. See Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1561, "United
States Patent and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003," Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/rogan040303.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2003) (statement of James E. Rogan, Under Secretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO); see also President Seeks More Funding,
Less Diversion for PTO, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Feb. 5, 2003, at 1; Tamara Loomis,
Patents and Trademarks Opposition Has Scaled Back Overhaul of PTO, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13,
2003, at 5.
6. Maureen Sirhal, Daily Briefing: PTO Chief Unveils Plan To Overhaul Patent
Reviews, GOV'T EXECUTIVE (June 3, 2002), at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0602/
060302tdl.htm; see also Tanya N. Ballard, Daily Briefing: Patent Examiners Reject
Proposal To Outsource Patent Searches, GOV'T EXECUTIVE (July 29, 2002), at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0702/072902tl.htm. Outsourcing prior art searches has
also concerned several members of the Patent Information Users Group (PLUG), a non-
profit organization for professionals specializing in the retrieval, analysis, and
dissemination of patent information. See Nancy Lambert, That Was the Year That Was-
Patents 2002, SEARCHER, Apr. 2003, at 25. Lambert summarizes five concerns expressed
by some PIUG members:
1. The certification might be administered by people who don't know what
they're doing and/or use inappropriate criteria.
2. The certification process might favor large search firms vs. small firms and
independent patent professionals, since the PTO might not want to go through
the certification process for just one or two searchers.
3. Because companies filing patents would not be permitted to submit search
reports prepared by their in-house searchers (due to possible conflict of interest),
the in-house searchers-much of PIUG membership-might face sudden job
insecurity.
4. The examiners remaining at the PTO might lose their in-depth knowledge of
PTO patent classifications if they no longer perform searches, to the detriment of
U.S. classifications' continued development and the reclassification of old
patents.
5. PTO management may just be trying to reduce costs by reducing the number
of examiners, at the same time increasing PTO fees, so as to permit Congress to
raid even more of those fees for other purposes.
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characterized outsourcing prior art searches as putting "the fox in charge
of the henhouse.
'7
Some activities are ideally suited for outsourcing to the private sector.8
However, because a patent examiner's decision regarding the
patentability of an invention disclosed in an application depends on the
results of the prior art search,9 outsourcing the prior art search raises two
important questions. First, is the prior art search function so closely
intertwined with the examiner's quasi-judicial patentability
determination so as to preclude its separation from the patentability
determination? Second, is the prior art search, like the ultimate
patentability determination, such an inherent governmental function as
to prevent its outsourcing?
Anyone who prepares or prosecutes a patent application has a duty of
disclosure, candor, and good faith. '° Rule 56 of the USPTO Regulations
dictates who has the duty to disclose," to whom the duty of disclosure is12 13
owed, 2 and the particular information required to be disclosed. To
Id.
7. Sirhal, supra note 6 (quoting Ronald Stern, President of the Patent Office
Professional Association); see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Frequently Asked
Questions - Compiled from Examiner E-mails to Under Secretary Rogan, at Q-10,
(requiring that an applicant must obtain a search report from only a Certified Search
Service "to avoid a conflict of interest and [the] so-called 'fox-in-the-henhouse'
situation"), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat200l/faqcompiled.htm (last
modified Dec. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
8. See Office of Management & Budget, Circular No. A-76, at 2, Attachment A,
Aug. 4, 1983 (Rev. 1999).
9. See John L. Welsh, Searching- To Find Art, G-667 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
PREPARING PATENT LEGAL OPINIONS 71, 75 (2001) (concluding that the patentability
opinion is "only as good as the search results it is based upon"); see also U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office: Fee Schedule Adjustment and Agency Reform, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 91 (2002) [hereinafter House Hearing on USPTO Reform]
(statement of Ronald J. Stern, President, Patent Office Professional Association) ("The
patentability determination can only be as good as the prior art on which that patentability
determination is founded."); Patents: Improving Quality and Curing Defects, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22 (2001) [hereinafter House Hearing on Patent
Quality] (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer, & Murphy,
LLP) ("[W]hen a properly trained PTO examiner has all relevant information, he or she
can make an accurate conclusion on patentability of an invention.").
10. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2002).
11. Id. § 1.56(c).
12. Id. § 1.56(a).
13. Id.
2003]
Catholic University Law Review
comply with Rule 56, applicants typically submit all relevant documents
to the USPTO for the examiner's consideration.
14
Although applicants need to disclose known relevant documents, they
do not need to conduct a prior art search. 15 Therefore, examiners must
conduct their own prior art searches independent of applicants' prior art
disclosures.16  Thus, both examiners and applicants "share the
responsibility of ensuring that pertinent prior art is ... considered during
examination. 17 If adopted, the USPTO's Strategic Plan would shift these
relative responsibilities by requiring the examiner to rely exclusively on a
prior art search conducted by a commercial vendor.8 Such a shift in
relative responsibilities is both legally and practically problematic. 9
Because the patentability decision is essentially dictated by the prior art
search, a private search firm would potentially possess an unprecedented
ability to influence the patentability decision."'
Part I of this Comment reviews the presumption of validity accorded
to granted U.S. patents and describes both the patent examination
process and the search for relevant prior art. Part II explores recent
developments in Europe and the United States regarding the prior art
search function. Part III argues that the prior art search is inherently
part of patent examination and, therefore, cannot be appropriately
outsourced. Moreover, this Part argues that the prior art search is
inherently a governmental function so intimately related to the public
interest as to require government employees to perform the search.
14. Id. §§ 1.97-1.98; see also House Hearing on Patent Quality, supra note 9, at 21
(statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, LLP)
(noting that the reason applicants provide the USPTO with all relevant prior art prior to
examination is that "[t]he fully informed opinions of an [e]xaminer are worth far more
than an opinion on an incomplete record").
15. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 609, at 600-18 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
8th ed., 2001) ("There is no requirement that an applicant for a patent make a
patentability search."); see also FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6
(Fed. Cir. 1987) ("As a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a prior art search, and
thus there is no duty to disclose art of which an applicant could have been aware."). But
see John A. Dienner, Lightening the Load of the Patent Examiner, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
148, 151 (1965) (noting that "[g]enerally, no worthwhile application for patent is filed
without a search [of] previously acquired knowledge of the prior art").
16. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2002) (mandating that the examiner "make a
thorough investigation of the available prior art relating to the subject matter of the
claimed invention"). See generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra
note 15, § 904.02 (requiring a thorough search of the prior art as part of the examination of
a patent application).
17. USPTO Public Hearing on Prior Art, supra note 2, at 28,804.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II1.
20. See infra Part Ill.
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Finally, Part IV provides an alternative to outsourcing the examiner's
prior art search by suggesting a three-pronged search approach that
combines the relative expertise of examiners, private search firms, and
state-of-the-art automated search tools to obtain the most
comprehensive search results practicable.
I. THE "STRONG" PRESUMPTION OF PATENT VALIDITY: COURTS'
DEFERENCE TO USPTO TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
A. The Presumption of Validity of Granted U.S. Patents
U.S. patents are presumed valid." Because courts defer to the
USPTO's special technical expertise" and have faith in the examination
process, challengers must show a patent is invalid by clear and
24
convincing evidence. The courts' deference to the integrity of the
examination process, however, is predicated on the examiner's
consideration of the most pertinent prior art during examination. 2  Thus,
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
22. Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 784 F.Supp. 648, 669 (E.D. Mo. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Bolkcom v. Carborundum
Co., 523 F.2d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that every patent issued by the USPTO
possesses an initial presumption of validity, which is justified by patent law complexities
and USPTO expertise). Qualifications of examiners vary widely among individual
examiners and among technologies. See Scott Wolinsky, An Inside Look at the Patent
Examination Process, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2002, at 18. One commentator noted,
"All examining positions require at least a bachelor's degree in computer science, physical
science or engineering, and varying levels of professional engineering experience or
graduate study." Id. The USPTO also hires recent law school graduates and people with
doctoral degrees. Id.
23. John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 159, 183 (1999).
24. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). But see
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1529
(2001) (arguing that the presumption of validity should be rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence).
25. See John L. King, Patent Examination Procedures as Inputs to Patent Quality, at
19, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., forthcoming 2003) (concluding
that "the quality of patent examination affects the validity of issued patents"), available at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/King-paper.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2003); see
also House Hearing on Patent Quality, supra note 9, at 55 (statement of James F. Cottone,
President, National Intellectual Property Researchers Association) (noting that a quality
examination results when the examiner considers a complete set of all pertinent
references, typically between 1,000 to 3,000 documents depending on the technology and
particular application); Howard M. Eisenberg, Patent Law You Can Use: Patentability
Searching (2000), at 3-4 (noting that a challenger has a heavy burden to overcome a
patent's presumption of validity based on prior art considered during examination),
available at http://www.yale.edu/ocr/invent-guidelines/docs/patentability.pdf (last visited
2003]
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if the USPTO does not consider the most pertinent prior art, the validity
presumption is considerably weakened.26
Challengers must meet the clear and convincing evidentiary standard
in order to undermine the validity of a granted patent. When rejecting
a patent application prior to a patent's grant, however, the USPTO mustS 28
meet the standard of preponderance of the evidence. There are two
reasons for this inconsistency. In a pending application, the situation is
fluid; the applicant may freely amend or add claims and engages in ex
parte prosecution with the agency. 29 After the patent has been granted,
however, prosecution is closed, and the presumption of validity
effectively shifts the burden of persuasion to a challenger to prove the
patent's invalidity.30 Although some commentators have argued that
Jan. 31, 2003); Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1323 (noting the validity presumption "carries with it a
presumption that the [e]xaminer did his duty and knew what claims he was allowing").
26. See Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 413
(6th Cir. 1964); see also Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10) ("If the [USPTO] does not have needed information,
meaningful examination of patent applications will take place for the first time in an
infringement case before a district court."); Kasdan, supra note 23, at 183 (concluding that
if the USPTO knows that its examination is below its normal standard, such examinations
should not receive such a strong presumption of validity); lain Cockburn et al., Are All
Patent Examiners Equal? The Impact of Examiners on Patent Characteristics and
Litigation Outcomes, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 21 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
forthcoming 2003) (noting that the overall probability of a court upholding validity is
approximately fifty percent depending on the technological area and the age of the
patent), available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Stern-et-al- Paper.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2003); Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1970)
(noting that the presumption of validity "is merely an aid to inquiry and does not
automatically foreclose thought and analysis"). Cf Contour Chair Lounge Co. v. True-Fit
Chair, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 704, 716 (E.D. Mo. 1986) ("Introduction of prior art not
considered by the examiner can help the validity challenger carry its burdens ... but it
does not 'weaken' or otherwise affect the statutory presumption of validity.").
27. See, e.g., In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Ex pane prosecution
involves: (1) an initial patentability determination following examination of the
application; (2) notification of the applicant of the decision, which begins a fixed period of
time for the applicant to respond by submitting arguments and/or claim amendments; and
(3) a second patentability determination of the application as amended and in view of the
arguments presented. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 15, §
706, at 700-17, 700-18; see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.104(a)(2), 1.111, 1.134, (2002). Usually, the
second patentability determination is made final, thus limiting the applicant's ability to
amend the application. See Cockburn, supra note 26, at 7. At this stage, however, the
applicant may appeal the decision, abandon the application, or elect to prosecute the
application further by filing a continuing application. See id.
30. See, e.g., Etter, 756 F.2d at 858-59. But see Lemley, supra note 24, at 1529
(arguing that the presumption of validity should be rebutted by the preponderance of
evidence instead of clear and convincing evidence).
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imposing a higher evidentiary standard for granted patents is improper
for issues not considered by the USPTO,3' the validity presumption
nevertheless remains a useful procedural device by providing substantial
deference to USPTO patentability determinations.
B. Patent Examination: A Quasi-Judicial Process
The first U.S. patent examination system was implemented after
passage of the Patent Act of 1790.32 Modeled after the French system,
the U.S. system entrusted examination to cabinet-level officers who
examined applications on a part-time basis.33  Due in part to
dissatisfaction with the quality of the part-time examiners' work,
however, this system was soon replaced with a registration system.34
Lasting only a few decades, the registration system was a dismal failure35
and was abandoned in 1836 when Congress reestablished the
examination system. 36 Examination became a full-time public service
31. See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1528-29; see also Charles E. Phipps, The
Presumption of Administrative Correctness: The Proper Basis for the Clear and Convincing
Evidence Standard, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 143, 149-50 (2000) (arguing that the clear and
convincing standard is inappropriate in cases where the presumption of administrative
correctness does not apply).
32. Frank D. Prager, The Examination of Inventions from the Middle Ages to 1836, 46
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 268, 289 (1964).
33. Id.; see also B.E. Lanham & J. Leibowitz, Classification, Searching and
Mechanization in the U.S. Patent Office, 40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 86, 86-87 (1958) (noting
that patent classification was unnecessary in early examination efforts because the prior
art search required by the 1790 Act was limited to relatively few patents and books).
34. See Prager, supra note 32, at 289; see also John T. Roberts, A Reappraisal of the
American System of Patent Examining, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 156, 164 (1966) (noting that
another reason for replacing the examination system with the registration system was the
shortage of formally educated people to examine applications).
35. Prager, supra note 32, at 289; see also Roberts, supra note 34, at 166-67 (quoting
an 1836 Congressional report explaining that the registration system's failure was due to
(1) the granting of a considerable number of invalid patents, (2) the flooding of patent
monopolies, (3) the alarming rise in litigation, and (4) the increase in fraud on the Patent
Office). See generally Lemley, supra note 24, at 1527 (noting that one of the advantages of
an examination system over a registration system is that it requires patentees to restrict
the scope of their claims, thereby preventing overly broad claims from covering entire
industries); Linck et al., supra note 4, at 313 (noting that abandoning examination
altogether would overburden the courts and unreasonably increase costs).
36. Prager, supra note 32, at 289-90. See generally Michael N. Meller, Treating the
Cause and Not the Symptoms: A Case for Delayed Examination, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
247, 254-55 (1964) (distinguishing patent examination systems from registration systems by
noting that, unlike registration systems, examination systems attach a presumption of
validity to patents in view of patent examiners searching, evaluating, and thoroughly
deliberating the merits of the invention).
2003]
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occupation performed by professionals specializing in reviewing
applications.37
Today, the examination system is mandated by statute, which directs
the USPTO to "cause an examination to be made" and to issue a patent
if the applicant is so entitled under the law.38  While the term
"examination" is not further defined in the statute, USPTO regulations
detail the examination process.39 Rule 104 requires the examiner to study
the patent application, investigate "the available prior art relating to the
subject matter of the claimed invention," and ensure compliance with
applicable law, patentability, and matters of form.40  Based on the
preponderance of the evidence,4' the examiner decides whether the
invention is new, useful, novel, and nonobvious under established
41
statutory standards. Patent examiners have been characterized as
quasi-judicial officials who must possess both technical and legal skills to
perform their duties.4 ' This quasi-judicial function has effectively served
its purpose since the inception of the modern examination system. 4
The USPTO has noted that "[l]ocating relevant prior art is one of the
most important aspects of the patent examining process., 45 Indeed, the
integrity of the examination system depends on the thoroughness of the
37. Prager, supra note 32, at 290. Indeed, the first patent examiner hired in 1836 was
intimately familiar with the prior art collection at that time and was directed to apply prior
art to reject applications. See id.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000). As noted by one commentator, the modern patent system
is basically equivalent to that of 1836. See Meller, supra note 36, at 257.
39. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2002). Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387-88 (6th ed. 1991)
(defining the term examination in the invention context as "[a]n inquiry made at the
patent-office, upon application for a patent, into the novelty and utility of the alleged
invention, and as to its interfering with any other patented invention").
40. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2002).
41. See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1.445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[P]atentability is
determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due
consideration to persuasiveness of argument.").
42. See, e.g., Lee Pharms. v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1978). See generally 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (discussing the specific determinations an examiner must make
for a patentability decision).
43. W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("It is no
more appropriate to question a patent examiner's technical expertise than it is to question
the quality of a judge's law school education or judicial experience."); see also discussion
supra note 22. See generally Butterworth v. United States ex rel Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 67
(1884) (noting the quasi-judicial nature of the patent examiner's position).
44. See Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 1, 216 (1936). See generally Linck et al., supra note 4, at 306-07 (1998) (noting that
as of 1998, the U.S. patent examination system, in which "patent applications have been
examined for novelty, usefulness, and inventiveness," served the nation well for over 160
years).
45. USPTO Public Hearing on Prior Art, supra note 2, at 28,804.
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prior art search associated with every application." Accordingly, under
Rule 104, the examiner must thoroughly investigate the prior art relating
to the claimed invention47 and consider all subject matter pertinent to the
disclosure.48 Thus, the examiner is interested in identical subject matter
as well as all related and analogous content. 49 Throughout the search, the
examiner must consider the scope and approach of the search while
studying each document." Thus, as the examiner uncovers art during the
search, he or she can modify the search accordingly and, if necessary,
identify additional search areas to expand the search."
As noted in a 1961 Judiciary Committee study of the examination
process, the examiner must use sound judgment in assessing the extent of
the prior art search.53 Moreover, the Committee emphasized that
examiners obtain their "specialized knowledge" only through experience
and that such "specialized knowledge" is critical to understanding prior
46. Arthur Schwartz, The Effect of Mechanized Searching on Patent Practice and
Litigation, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 803, 803-04 (1962) (quoting a 1962 address by David L.
Ladd, Commissioner of Patents, in which Commissioner Ladd noted that "the validity of
any given patent and ultimately the soundness of the examination system depends upon
how thoroughly [the] files are searched for each application"); see also John R. Allison &
Emerson H. Tiller, Internet Business Method Patents, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 3-4 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A.
Merrill eds., forthcoming 2003) (noting that courts most commonly invalidate patents
because of prior art that was not before the examiner), available at http://www7.
nationalacademies.org/step/Tiler-et-al-paper.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
47. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2002). See generally USPTO Public Hearing on Prior
Art, supra note 2, at 28,804 (noting that one of the "most important aspects" of patent
examination is locating prior art); Lanham & Leibowitz, supra note 33, at 97
(characterizing the patent search as an inquiry into whether there is "a disclosure
anywhere of the concept expressed in the claimed subject matter"). But see SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., THE EXAMINATION SYSTEM IN THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE,
STUDY NO. 29 14 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY NO. 29]
(noting that the USPTO cannot undertake a "validity search" of several weeks' duration
inspecting every possible publication-no matter how remote).
48. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 15, § 904.03, at 900-
55. Conducting the search requires the examiner to identify the scope and extent of the
search, select the proper search tools, and "determin[e] the appropriate search strategy for
each search tool selected." Id. § 904.02, at 900-51. A proper field of search includes the
appropriate subclasses in which the claimed subject matter is classified in the U.S.
classification system. Id. § 904.02(a), at 900-52. As a corollary to conducting an effective
classified search, however, experience and familiarity with the individual patents within
particular subclasses are essential. See S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY NO. 29, supra note
47, at 12.
49. Lanham & Leibowitz, supra note 33, at 88.
50. See id.
51. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 806.
52. See Lanham, supra note 33, at 88.
53. S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 14.
2003]
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art developments and the subject matter of the invention.54 The Judiciary
Committee also noted that the extent and adequacy of the search depend
on the examiner's experience, competency, sufficient patent classification
efforts, and work-related pressures.55 The Committee concluded that,
ultimately, "[t]he examiner's competence and judgment in analyzing the
subject matter of the invention, and its possible relationship to prior
development, determine[] the extent and quality of the investigation of
the prior art. '' 16  Thus, the examiner's judgment, competence, and
experience are critical factors affecting prior art search quality.
The responsibility of ensuring consideration of pertinent prior art
during examination is shared between patent examiners, who must
thoroughly search the prior art under Rule 104, and applicants, who must
submit information known to them to be material to patentability under
Rule 56. 7  The USPTO recognizes, however, that certain emerging
technologies, such as telecommunications and computer-related arts,
present unique search challenges because the best prior art exists mainly
in non-patent literature that is difficult to access.58 The magnitude of the
problem and resulting public criticism motivated the USPTO to conduct
public hearings on the issue in 1999.'9
The problem is exacerbated by the limited time available for
examiners to conduct the prior art search.60 An examiner is allotted an
54. Id. at 16-17.
[E]xperience is necessary to obtain a specialized knowledge of the art and also to
become familiar with the sources of such knowledge, that is, the prior
publications in the particular field. This specialized knowledge is necessary to
understand the subject matter of the application and.., prior art developments.
Id.
55. Id. at 14-16.
56. Id. at 16; see also R. Lee Grantham, The PTO's 21st Century Strategic Plan: A
Review and Comments Regarding Quality and the Prior Art Function, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, Nov. 2002, at 6-8 ("Patent searching is a qualitative activity... [requiring] sorting
through hundreds of printed documents and selecting a handful that, solely in the
searcher's judgment, contain salient features [that] suggest similarity to the inventor's
idea.").
57. USPTO Public Hearing on Prior Art, supra note 2, at 28,804.
58. See id. at 28,804-05; see also Bruce A. Lehman, The Leadership of the USA in the
Field of Intellectual Property, Bus. PERSP., Summer/Fall 2001, at 22 (concluding that even
with an adequate number of examiners, the USPTO is unable to deal effectively with
applications involving business methods and computer software "because it lacks a
comprehensive and easily accessible database of non-patent prior art").
59. USPTO Public Hearing on Prior Art, supra note 2, at 28,804.
60. See John R. Thomas, Collusion & Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (2001); see also S. JUDICIARY
COMM. STUDY NO. 29, supra note 47, at 16 (noting that because examiners are confronted
with the demands of disposing of at least a reasonable number of applications from an
increasing backlog, "the examiner necessarily limits his search to the minimum that he
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average of between sixteen and seventeen hours for each application,
about sixty percent of which is spent on the prior art search.62
Additionally, substantial time allotment differences exist among
individual examiners due to their seniority and to the technical
complexity of their respective disciplines.63  Despite these time
constraints, the Intellectual Property Law Section of the American Bar
Association (ABA) concluded that U.S. examiners "can perform the
best, highest quality searches in the world."64  Conversely, some
considers satisfactory"); Wolinsky, supra note 22, at 18 ("Each USPTO examiner is
allocated a specific number of hours to spend during the prosecution of a patent
application .... Unlike in a law firm where attorneys bill for each hour worked, patent
examiners work on a piecemeal basis whereby the examiner is credited only for the
number of applications examined."); Milton Weissman, Testimony Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, Relating to S.
1321 (Hart Bill), 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 604, 606-07 (1973) (quoting a 1918 Assistant
Commissioner's speech addressed to examiners that "[i]f you have to choose between
making a less thorough examination and a general and material delay in getting the
applications through, it is probably more to the public interest that the prosecution be
prompt ... [and] ... if your examination is not sufficiently thorough, this is directly the
fault of Congress"). Cf. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d
867, 887 (2d Cir. 1971) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (reminding the majority that the lack of
Patent Office time and staffing to permit exhaustion of the prior art has not persuaded
Congress that there is a problem with the system due to the existence of the statutory
presumption of validity).
61. Thomas, supra note 60, at 314. Another commentator made the following
startling observation:
Examiners have astonishingly little time to spend on each application-on
average, a total of eighteen hours, including the time spent reading the
application, reading the submitted prior art, searching for and reading prior art in
databases accessible to the PTO, comparing that prior art to the application,
writing an office action, reading and responding to the response to office action,
iterating the last two steps at least one and often more times, conducting an
interview with the applicant, and ensuring that the diagrams and claims are in
form for allowance.
Lemley, supra note 24, at 1496 n.3. In view of the time constraint, Lemley suggests
doubling the amount of time allotted to examiners. See id. at 1508.
62. Simon M. Newman, Information Retrieval Research in the U.S. Patent Office, 42 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 731,731 (1965).
63. See Cockburn, supra note 26, at 9 ("[E]xaminers may vary substantially in their
effective average 'approval time."').
64. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Charles P.
Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law Section, American Bar Association); see also
Roberts, supra note 34, at 190 (noting a study in which many defendants of valid patents
generally found no better art than examiners-even after searching areas the examiner
seldom considers). But see Harold C. Wegner, International Patent Law Developments, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 329, 337-38 (1993) (concluding that the
European search is "the best in the world" in view of the "brilliant" searches performed
by the treaty-based corps of EPO career examiners); Lemley, supra note 24, at 1528
(noting that examiners "regularly miss the most relevant prior art"); House Hearing on
Patent Quality, supra note 9, at 61 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director,
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commentators have harshly criticized the USPTO for issuing patents of
allegedly poor quality. Critics cite high examiner turnover,65 lack of
experience in certain areas (e.g., business methods), 66 and ignorance of
67relevant prior art due to time pressure. Critics have also alleged that
examiners give only cursory consideration to non-patent literature in
areas where such literature is more important to the prior art search than
patents.
68
In response to such criticism, the USPTO implemented concrete
measures to improve search quality, most notably by promulgating Rule
105 in 2000.69 In essence, Rule 105 authorizes the examiner to require an
applicant to provide any information deemed "reasonably necessary" to
examine the application properly.0 In theory, this requirement ensures
American Intellectual Property Law Association) ("[E]xaminers sometimes don't find the
best prior art, and sometimes when they do, their judgments are little bit short.").
65. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
606 (1999); see also Harold C. Wegner, Patent Simplification Sans Patent Fraud, 20 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 211, 222 (1992) (noting that the status, salary, and perquisites
of EPO examiners lead to career employees unlike the relatively high turnover
encountered with U.S. examiners).
66. David Schumann, Obviousness with Business Methods, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727,
764 (2002).
67. Id. at 765.
68. Merges, supra note 65, at 589-90; see also Andrew M. Riddles & Brenda
Pomerance, Software Patentee Must Conduct Own Search: Prior-Art Searches Made by the
Patent Office Often Are Not Thorough Enough To Be Trusted, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 1998, at
C19 (alleging that USPTO's issuance of software patents is tantamount to a "mere
registration process" because few patents have issued in this area and the examiner's
search does not include the most relevant non-patent prior art); Lehman, supra note 58, at
22 ("[E]ffective examination today requires comparing claimed inventions with
information disclosed in countless journals and other publications to which PTO
examiners have limited access and for which they lack effective search tools."). Moreover,
Bruce Lehman, a former USPTO Commissioner, has concluded that the tools and
techniques for patent searching are more effective than those for non-patent literature.
See id. at 23. Mr. Lehman concludes that the primary reasons for this discrepancy are the
following: (1) the diverse nature of non-patent documents precludes the ability to search
such documents "across the entire database;" and (2) non-patent literature can be
searched only by "key words developed by a given examiner." Id. Mr. Lehman further
noted that even though U.S. examiners have access to databases of both the European and
Japanese patent offices, examiners do not routinely consider prior art from other large
patent offices, such as South Korea and China. Id. at 23.
69. Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,604, 54,633-35
(Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts 1, 3, 5, & 10). See generally 37 C.F.R. §
1.105 (2002).
70. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1) (2002); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE, supra note 15, § 704.11, at 700-07 (noting that the standard of "reasonable
necessity" is generally met where: (1) the claimed subject matter cannot be adequately
searched, or (2) either the application file or lack of relevant prior art found in the
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that the examiner has at least a minimum threshold level of relevant
prior art on which to base a patentability decision.' The examiner's use
of Rule 105, however, is not a substitute for a prior art search, which is
performed by the examiner.72
The promulgation of Rule 105 is just one of a number of efforts
worldwide to reform the prior art search process.73 While international
patent offices attach great importance to the prior art search, patent
offices are under unprecedented pressure to increase efficiency,
74
motivating several noteworthy changes to prior art searching.75 The
following section contrasts two recent developments regarding the prior
examiner's search justifies asking the applicant for more information germane to the
patentability determination).
71. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1) (2002).
72. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 15, § 704.11, at 700-
07.
73. See infra Part ILA; see also Harold C. Wegner, Japanese E-Business and Internet
Patents: A Comparative View in the Context of Patent Enforcement 6 n.3 (presented at the
10th Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Fordham
University Law School, Apr. 4-5, 2002) (concluding that because the Japanese Patent
Office outsourced the prior art search, Japanese examiners have more time for judging
patentability, thus "elevating the quality of their position"), available at
http://www.foleylardner.com/FILES/tbl-s31Publications/Fileupload137/761/wegner-japan
eseEbiz.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2003); JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (JPO), Examination
Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in Japan, Part IX: Procedure of Examination, § 4,
Prior Art Search, at 3-5 (describing the JPO's establishment of the Industrial Property
Cooperation Center (IPCC) as a search organization to assist the agency by conducting
prior art searches on behalf of examiners), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzukie/
index.htm (last updated Mar. 8, 2002).
74. See PATENTS DIRECTORATE, THE PATENT OFFICE (GREAT BRITAIN),
Consultation on a Proposal to Contract Out Some Patent Searches and Examinations (Mar.
21, 2002), at 3 (noting the strain on global patent offices is due to the insufficient number
of examiners to examine the increasing numbers of applications), available at
http://www.patent.gov.uk/ about/consultations/contract/contract.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2002).
75. See, e.g., THE PATENT OFFICE (GREAT BRITAIN), UK and Danish Patent Offices
Increase Competitiveness Through Patent Search Deal (describing the British Patent
Office's contract to outsource patent searches for 750 patent applications to the Danish
Patent & Trademark Office in order to "increas[e] the speed of its service to meet
customer demand"), at http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/press/releases/2003/200203.htm
(last updated Feb. 24, 2003); see also AIPLA/FICPI Colloquium on Pendency Reduction,
Rome, Italy, Nov. 18-19, 2001, at 3 (quoting Dr. Ingo Kober, President, EPO, noting that
the EPO's implemented measures to respond to its increase in workload include: (1)
"rationalizing" its work under the Patent Cooperation Treaty to "place more emphasis on
the examination carried out at the time of the search," and (2) bringing examination and
search together), available at http://www.aipla.org/html/ficpi/2001/ficpilll8.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2003); id. at 4 (quoting Shinjiro Ono, Director-General of Appeals Dep't,
Japan Patent Office (JPO), noting that the JPO's response to its increasing workload
included outsourcing prior art searches to the Industrial Property Cooperation Center
(IPCC), which maintains "close communications" with JPO examiners).
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art search at the European Patent Office (EPO) and the USPTO.
Interestingly, while both patent offices are faced with similar pressures,
they have proposed diametrically opposite solutions.76
II. RECENT U.S. AND EUROPEAN PRIOR ART SEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
A. The EPO's BEST Initiative: A Unified Search and Examination
Process
The EPO is an international patent organization that utilizes a
centralized procedure to enable an applicant to obtain patent protection
in twenty European countries with a single patent grant.77  Like the
USPTO, the EPO employs an examination system that relies on a prior
art search. 8  Unlike the USPTO, the EPO historically separated the
search and substantive examination into two distinct prosecution stages.79
A "search examiner" conducted the search, and a "substantive
examiner" performed the examination.80 Under this system, a search
examiner studied the application, searched for the prior art documents,
and provided a search report to a substantive examiner.8" A substantive
examiner then studied the same application and the search report,
resulting in a duplication of effort.82
To eliminate this perceived inefficiency, the EPO launched an official
project in 1993 for Bringing Examination and Search Together (BEST). 3
As its name suggests, BEST assigns both search and examination
functions to a single examiner. 4 The benefits realized by the EPO
include reducing the time required per application, eliminating conflicts
between search and substantive examiners, and increasing the
consistency between the search and substantive examiners regarding
76. Compare Part II.A infra, with Part II.B infra.
77. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, The European Patent Office, at 7, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/general/pdf/general.pdf (last
updated Oct. 18, 2001).
78. Id. at 9. See generally Wegner, supra note 65, at 222-23 (distinguishing EPO
examiners from U.S. examiners by characterizing EPO examiners as "an elite diplomatic
corps" with "great status" coupled with favorable salary and perquisites, greater
experience, better language skills, higher specialization, and much lower work quotas).
79. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent
Office, ch. II, Pt. B, at 2, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/
gui-lines/pdf/a4berl.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
80. Michel Marandon, BEST and the Latest Trends in Automation in the EPO, at
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cited documents." Although BEST has not yet been fully implemented,"
it has been highly successful to date" with full-scale implementation
planned between 2004 and 2006.8
B. The USPTO 21st Century Strategic Plan: Outsourcing the Prior Art
Search to Commercial Vendors
In stark contrast to the EPO's BEST initiative, the USPTO has
proposed not only to separate the search and examination functions, but
also to contract out the search to a commercial vendor.89 In a report
accompanying the Patent and Trademark Authorization Act of 2002, the
Judiciary Committee required the USPTO to "develop a [five]-year
strategic plan to establish goals and methods by which the agency can
enhance patent and trademark quality while reducing application
pendency."9  To this end, the committee directed the USPTO to
"eliminate any task currently imposed on examiners that can be handled
by administrative staff." 91  Moreover, to increase efficiency, the
committee ordered the USPTO to rely on "earlier search and
examination results from the [EPO] performed under the Patent
85. Id. Despite these perceived drawbacks of the EPO system, at least one
commentator feels that the EPO search is the best in the world. See Wegner, supra note
64, at 337.
86. See AIPLA/FICPI Colloquium on Pendency Reduction, supra note 75, at 3
(quoting Dr. Ingo Kober, President, EPO, predicting that, as of Nov. 2001, the BEST
program "will be introduced office-wide within the [next] four or five years"), available at
http://www.aipla.org/html/ficpi/2001/ficpill18.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2003); see also
Samson Helfgott, International Intellectual Property Group News, 18 INTELL. PROP. L.
NEWSL. (ABA Section of Intellectual Prop. Law, Chicago, I11.), Spring 2000, at 24.
87. See Bruce A. McDonald, International Intellectual Property Rights, 35 INT'L LAW.
465, 467 (2001) (noting that the BEST project "has been expanded with positive results");
see also John J. Gresens, Colloquium on the Reduction of Patent Examination Pendency,
20 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. (ABA Section of Intellectual Prop. Law, Chicago, Ill.),
Winter 2002, at 45 (noting the EPO's expansion of BEST as a solution to handle its
backlog).
88. See AIPLA/FICPI Colloquium on Pendency Reduction, supra note 75, at 3; see
also Irwin M. Krittman, Recent Developments in the EPO, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL.
(ABA Section of Intell. Property Law, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2000, at 27; Helfgott, supra
note 86.
89. Under the revised Strategic Plan, the USPTO selects the contractor. See U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
However, the USPTO initially proposed in 2002 that the applicant would select the
contractor. See id.; see also THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, pt. 3, P-
01, at 8.
90. H.R. REP. No. 107-190, at 2 (2001); see also S. 1754, 107th Cong. § 4 (2002)
(enacted).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 107-190, at 6 (2001).
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Cooperation Treaty. 9 2 The agency was also encouraged to use contract
personnel more imaginatively to assist examiners in "administrative
tasks."93
On June 3, 2002, the USPTO unveiled its Strategic Plan, which was
later revised in February 2003.94 The agency announced the "aggressive
and far-reaching" 95 Strategic Plan as "a systematic attempt to incorporate
the best-thinking of our applicants, our counterparts in Europe, Japan,
and other countries, and our stakeholders. '" 96 The Strategic Plan is
detailed and comprehensive, proposing unprecedented changes to
virtually the entire spectrum of USPTO operations to achieve three
major goals: "agility," "capability," and "productivity. '" 97 The Strategic
Plan, however, introduces a particularly controversial change to the
current examination system that will have significant implications for the
patentability determination - the implementation of a "multi-track"
examination process.98
The Strategic Plan proposes to replace the current examination process
with a "multi-track" system.99 With limited exceptions,'0° the proposal
precludes U.S. examiners from conducting prior art searches. 1 Instead,
the USPTO will rely solely on search results provided by private
contractors or foreign intellectual property offices having bilateral
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally THE 21 ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Id. at 2. See generally House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 7
(statement of James E. Rogan, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
and Director of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office) (justifying the Strategic Plan by
predicting that, if nothing is done by the USPTO, patent pendency rates could reach three
to four years from the current average of two years).
97. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 5.
98. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO), THE 21ST CENTURY
STRATEGIC PLAN, Multi-Track Patent Examination Process, at 1-2, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/p2pOl.htm (last modified Apr. 3,
2003).
99. Id.
100. The first track of the multi-track examination process provides that the U.S.
examiner would conduct the prior art search as a near-term measure. Id. at 3. However,
the USPTO expects that the number of applications searched by U.S. examiners will
diminish as more searches are outsourced. Id. Another exception involves the examiner's
assessment of the quality of the contractor's search. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Certification of Searching Authorities, at
2, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q8pO7_Ol.htm (last modified
Apr. 3, 2003) (noting that if the examiner concludes the contractor's search is inadequate
after reviewing the submitted search report and cited prior art, "the examiner in his/her
discretion might perform a supplemental search as appropriate").
101. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 3.
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agreements with the USPTO.' 2 By reducing the examiner's search
burden in this manner, the USPTO predicts certain benefits. 3 These
benefits include: a five to twenty percent examiner productivity increase
because examiners will "better" spend their time on patentability
analysis;'04 cost savings via reduced search time and effort; and
elimination of the need for an extensive search system infrastructure
supporting high-volume searching. 5
Under the revised Strategic Plan, the USPTO will conduct the prior art
search by first selecting a commercial vendor (known as a "Certified
Search Service" (CSS)) that submits a certified search report upon which
the examiner will rely.' °6 However, if a search is deemed inadequate, the
examiner will: (1) perform a "supplemental search" subject to
supervisory approval, or (2) require the contractor to "correct" the
search and search report.0 7  In contrast, the original Strategic Plan
provided that if the examiner determined the search was inadequate, he
or she would notify the applicant and seek supplemental information
under Rule 105. Although it is unclear why Rule 105 was not
mentioned in the revised Strategic Plan in connection with the examiner's
remedies to correct an inadequate CSS search, presumably Rule 105 will
remain available to examiners.' 9
102. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Multi-Track Patent Examination
Process, supra note 98, at 3-7.
103. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 9.
104. Id. at 9; see also Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1561, "United States Patent and
Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003," Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2003)
(statement of James E. Rogan, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
and Director of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office) ("By outsourcing the search
function, we can ensure that the patent examiners of tomorrow will be like the quality
review examiners of yesterday in that they will begin with a more complete search and set
of information as their starting point."); Wegner, supra note 73, at 6 n.3 (concluding that
because the Japanese Patent Office outsourced the prior art search, Japanese examiners
have more time for judging patentability, thus "elevating the quality of their position").
105. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 3.
106. See id. at 8.
107. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Certification of Searching Authorities,
supra note 100, at 2.
108. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 11; see also
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-12, Q-20 (noting that examiners may use
Rule 105 to request specific technical information from applicants via a CSS). See
generally supra notes 69-72 and accompanying discussion of Rule 105.
109. See supra note 108. See generally supra notes 69-72 and accompanying discussion
of Rule 105.
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A CSS must be certified by the USPTO," ° and following initial
certification, the CSS must periodically be re-certified."' Under the
original Strategic Plan, an applicant using a CSS would still have been
subject to the duty of candor and good faith under Rule 56.112
Presumably, comparable standards would apply to a USPTO-selected
CSS under the revised Strategic Plan."' Thus, under commensurate
standards, a CSS will be considered to have acted in good faith provided
there is no intent to mislead the USPTO, the search incorporates a
reasonable set of search criteria, and it reasonably encompasses the
scope of the prior art."
4
III. IS IT APPROPRIATE TO OUTSOURCE THE PRIOR ART SEARCH?
Despite the laudable goals cited in the Strategic Plan, outsourcing the
search is inappropriate in view of substantial legal and practical
problems."5 The prior art search is a discretionary decision-making
110. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Certification of Searching Authorities,
supra note 100, at 2. The original Strategic Plan envisioned a certification process to
employ a process similar to the ISO 9000 certification technique. THE 21ST CENTURY
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 11. However, the revised Strategic Plan states that the
USPTO will use "a process similar to the ISO 9001 certification technique and/or similar
contract provisions." THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Certification of Searching
Authorities, supra note 100, at 2. Although it is unclear why the USPTO shifted from ISO
9000 to ISO 9001 standards, the USPTO has explained what certification criteria will be
employed:
The certification criteria would be similar to those utilized to designate an
International Search Authority (ISA) under PCT, such as number and type of
technical staff; the nature and extent of training provided; the manner of claim
interpretation; . . . competency to perform high quality searches, technical
knowledge and organizational infrastructure such as in-house databases or
search engines and access to external prior art databases (commercial data
bases).
Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-11 (noting that the USPTO
plans to discuss further enhancements to the search guidelines to include trilateral search
databases and non-patent literature). See generally International Organization for
Standardization, ISO 9000 for Busy Managers, in THE BASICS: THE MAGICAL AND
DEMYSTIFYING TOUR OF ISO 9000 AND ISO 14000, (explaining ISO 9000 as a "family of
standards represent[ing] an international consensus on good management practices" to
ensure an organization can consistently deliver products or services meeting the client's
quality requirements), at http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/iso9000-14OOO/tour/plain.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2003).
111. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 11; see also THE 21ST
CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Certification of Searching Authorities, supra note 100, at 2.
112. THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 8-9.
113. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, Certification of Searching Authorities,
supra note 100, at 1-3.
114. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 8-9.
115. See infra Parts III.A-E. But cf. Tamara Loomis, Opposition to Reform Has Scaled
Back Overhaul of PTO, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 2003, at 5 (noting that the general feeling
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process inextricably intertwined with examination so as to preclude its
outsourcing. 6 The prior art search is therefore inherently governmental
and is most appropriately performed by government examiners. "7
Moreover, practical problems resulting from outsourcing could actually
diminish the efficiency benefits sought to be achieved by the Strategic
Plan."
8
A. The Prior Art Search Function Is Necessarily Decision-Making Activity
Tantamount to an "Inherently Governmental Function"
As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. patent serves a
paramount public interest by granting exclusive constitutional privileges
to its owner." 9 The "far-reaching social and economic consequences" of
this grant necessitate that the patentability determination be free from
fraud or inequitable conduct. Accordingly, in exercising patentability
determinations, patent examiners act in a quasi-judicial capacity, 12' and
their decisions have significant social and economic impact. 2 Therefore,
the examiner's quasi-judicial role is a discretionary function' 23 that
among patent attorneys regarding outsourcing searches is that "the devil will be in the
details" and "whether it's a good or bad thing will depend on how it's implemented").
116. See discussion infra Parts IlIl.A, D.
117. See discussion infra Part III.A.
118. See discussion infra Part III.E.
119. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2002).
120. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816. See generally Lehman, supra note 58, at 21
("A patent is a very strong right, and owning a patent can have an extremely significant
economic impact.").
121. W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 431 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In fact, prior
to 1960, primary examiners had to have a law degree. Weissman, supra note 60, at 621.
122. Lindsey v. United States, 778 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting the
examiner's patentability determination necessarily involves decision-making "weighing
considerations of social, economic, and political policy"); see also Lehman, supra note 58,
at 21 ("A patent is a very strong right, and owning a patent can have an extremely
significant economic impact."); S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 26
(noting that because there is no general advocate for the public interest, "[t]he examiner
must act as a court of original jurisdiction and at the same time protect the public interest
against the grant of invalid patents as well as patents of unduly broad scope"); Al
Lawrence Smith, Negotiating With Patent Examiners, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 168, 169 (1990) ("[The examiner's] client is the public at large.").
123. See Lindsey, 778 F.2d at 1146 (holding a patent examiner immune from tort
liability under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2680, because the examiner's patentability determination necessarily involves
decision-making that weighs "considerations of social, economic, and political policy"); see
also Chamberlin v. Isen, 779 F.2d 522, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a patent
examiner met the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act because
the examiner's decision regarding clarity and definiteness of the application under 35
U.S.C. § 112 implicates the social and economic concerns underlying the patent system);
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clarifies and strengthens intellectual property rights, ultimately for the
public good. 124
The prior art search is a discretionary component of the quasi-judicial
examination process. 25  As noted by the Judiciary Committee in 1961,
the examiner must exercise judgment to determine the extent of the prior
art. '16 Moreover, the examiner's competence and judgment essentially
determine the quality of the prior art search. '2 Absent a quality search,
the examiner will not have the necessary information on which to base asoun paentailiy .. .. 28
sound patentability determination. Therefore, the prior art search
results essentially dictate the outcome of the quasi-judicial patentabilityd •• 129
decision. In view of the far-reaching social and economic consequences
of the examiner's decision, the quasi-judicial officials making such
decisions are best suited to obtain the prior art upon which to base their
Cockburn, supra note 26, at 24 (concluding that "[e]xaminers necessarily exercise
discretion").
124. See King, supra note 25, at 23 ("Patent examination contributes to the clarity and
strength of intellectual property rights, and therefore plays an important role in the patent
system as a whole."); see also Lehman, supra note 58, at 21 ("The quality and
trustworthiness of the examination system is at the core of investor confidence in many
high-tech companies."). But see Cockburn, supra note 26, at 9 (noting the inconsistency
among examiners in granting patents and concluding that "there may be as many patent
offices as there are patent examiners"); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the
Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 727, 759 (2002) ("The USPTO is Balkanized into technology-based
subdivisions that sometimes act under different search and examination policies than
other divisions.").
125. See Welsh, supra note 9, at 75 (concluding that the patentability opinion is "only
as good as the search results it is based upon"); see also House Hearing on USPTO
Reform, supra note 9, at 91 (statement of Ronald J. Stern, President, Patent Office
Professional Association) ("The patentability determination can only be as good as the
prior art on which that patentability determination is founded.").
126. S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY NO. 29, supra note 47, at 14 (noting that such
"judgment can only come with experience").
127. Id. at 16.
128. USPTO Public Hearing on Prior Art, supra note 2, at 28,804. In fact, one article
noted that the strength of a U.S. patent in litigation is directly proportional to the amount
of prior art the USPTO considers. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 101 (2002).
129. See discussion supra note 121.
130. See Lindsey v. United States, 778 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the
examiner's patentability determination necessarily involves decision-making that weighs
"considerations of social, economic, and political policy"); see also S. JUDICIARY COMM.
STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 26 (noting that because there is no general advocate for
the public interest, "[t]he examiner must act as a court of original jurisdiction and at the
same time protect the public interest against the grant of invalid patents as well as patents
of unduly broad scope"); Smith, supra note 122, at 169 ("[The examiner's] client is the
public at large.").
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decisions.' One might argue that an approved CSS would match or
exceed the examiner's technical competence and thus, theoretically, be
able to perform an equally valid search. 132 But, even if a private vendor's
search report appears to present quality results, it is still very difficult to
determine whether it can be trusted for a sound patentabilityd .• .. 133
determination. Moreover, even if one assumes the private vendor's
expertise and examiner's expertise are equivalent,14 one fundamental
difference distinguishes the examiner from the private vendor: the patent
examiner, unlike the commercial searcher, works solely for the public
interest with no ulterior economic motive.
Outsourcing other government activities involving decision-making
responsibility has resulted in serious government accountability
problems.'35 While there has been a recent trend towards privatization of
131. Even judges perform their own searches to support their legal conclusions. See,
e.g., In re Mines Tire Co., 194 B.R. 23, 24-25 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996). In a dispute
involving whether a publicly available and searchable financing statement was seriously
misleading, the court in In re Mines Tire Co. was not satisfied with either party's search of
the financial records. See id. Consequently, the court performed its own search to settle
the matter. See id. But cf Drew Clark, Lawyers Amenable to Compromise on Patent
Searches, NAT. J. TECH. DAILY (P.M. ED.), Apr. 15, 2003, at 2 (quoting Chris Katopis,
Deputy Administrator for USPTO External Affairs, who compared separating
examination and searching to the division of labor in a court-the jury is charged with
finding facts, while the judge applies the law).
132. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 3. But see Brian M.
Berliner, Predicting the Future by Studying the Past: Giving an Opinion on the Patentability
of an Invention, G-715 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PREPARING PATENT LEGAL
OPINIONS 2002, at 411, 416 (2002) (noting that private searchers usually lack the attorney's
level of understanding of the invention and may not appreciate its important subtleties);
Grantham, supra note 56, at 8 (distinguishing the public sector searcher (i.e., examiner)
from the private sector searcher by reasoning that the private sector searcher is merely a
generalist who "looks for broad teachings based on a limited disclosure," whereas an
examiner is recognized as an expert who has acquired a "feel for patentability based on
awareness of the historical aspect of specific art").
133. Welsh, supra note 9, at 87.
134. While it is difficult to assess whether the private vendor's expertise matches or
exceeds that of the examiner, anecdotal evidence suggests that private searchers often rely
on the examiner's expertise to ensure a complete search. See, e.g., Berliner, supra note
132, at 416 ("The searching agent may also consult with an [e]xaminer for the relevant art
unit in order to confirm that he has searched the most relevant classes and subclasses.");
see also Welsh, supra note 9, at 84 (noting that private searchers often consult with
examiners to identify the appropriate search areas); James F. Cottone, Online Patent
Searching: A Good News Story, But Not the Whole Story, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SoC'Y 233, 235 (1997) ("Not infrequently, an [examiner may advise the searcher to 'be on
the lookout for the Jones patent' or be sure to check the last few years (or the foreign art)
in a particular class or subclass . . . or may offer other guidance that leads directly to
[relevant prior art].").
135. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Legislative Innovation in State Brownfields
Redevelopment Programs, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 67 (2001) (noting the potential
problems with the privatization of prisons); see also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and
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certain traditional government activities, such as administering prisons 13 6
and schools,137 courts have been cognizant of the conflict between the
contractor's primary interest - the profit motive - and the public interest,
including the protection of constitutional rights.138 Indeed, in the context
of privatized prisons, the Sixth Circuit noted that the profit motive
provides a greater incentive for contractors to cut costs in ways that
infringe the constitutional rights of prisoners.'39 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the Sixth Circuit but was noticeably silent regarding the Sixth
Circuit's view on the constitutional implications of the conflict of
interest. 1411 While the Supreme Court's silence may be interpreted as tacit
approval, Justice Scalia's dissent noted that the majority's silence was
due to its disagreement with such an "implausible" theory.14
As emphasized by the Sixth Circuit, the specter of contractor cost-
cutting in order to maximize profits is a very real danger in privatized
activities. This danger would be particularly acute in a patent
examination context. Indeed, a favorable patentability decision resulting
from a private vendor's omission of the best prior art could confer
significant economic advantage to the patentee.1
43
If a patent examiner conducted the search, however, his or her search
judgment would be immune from pressures unique to the private sector,
such as the maximization of profits, market share, and competitive
advantage. 44 This distinction is fundamental because the prior art search
Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1525 (2001) (noting that contracting
out activities involving discretion and government power over individuals can raise serious
issues of government accountability).
136. See generally Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405 (1997).
137. See generally Beermann, supra note 135, at 1525 (discussing privately operated
schools).
138. See, e.g., McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 1996) affd sub nom,
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
139. Id. at 424 n.4.
140. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 414.
141. See id. at 421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See McKnight, 88 F.3d at 424 n.4.
143. See e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945) (emphasizing the significant economic consequences of a patent grant).
144. See Robert M. Sherwood et al., Promotion of Inventiveness in Developing
Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration, 39 IDEA 473, 480 (1999)
(concluding that full-time patent examiners are more credible than fixed-fee contractors
because contractors "may limit the time they devote to examinations, thus limiting the
extent of their searches"). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF
GENERAL COUNSEL, ETHICS DIVISION, Summary of Ethics Rules, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (2000), at 1, 2 (noting that employees of the USPTO are "placed in a
position of trust and are held to a high standard of ethical conduct and may not participate
in any matter implicating a financial conflict of interest"), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/acrobat/pto2000e.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2003);
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essentially dictates the outcome of the patentability determination. 45
While an examiner might determine that a comprehensive search
requires extending the search to additional areas, including foreign art, a
private vendor may be motivated to compromise the search by
performing a minimal,'4 misleading,' or substandard' search, or by
prematurely terminating it in order to maximize profits. 149 Given the
GALVESTON COUNTY SMALL Bus. DEV. CENTER, Know Your Competition and Increase
Your Competitive Advantage, at 1-3 (advising private sector businesses how to evaluate
their competition and increase their competitive advantage), available at
http://www.gc.edu/sbdc/articles/1998e/article5.htm (last modified July 9, 2002). The
examiner's immunity from private-sector pressures has likely contributed to the perceived
high quality of U.S. examiners' prior art searches. Indeed, the IP Law Section of the ABA
has concluded that "U.S. examiners generally can perform the best, highest quality
searches in the world." House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (2002)
(statement of Charles P. Baker, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American
Bar Association). But see PTO Draft Fee Bill and Strategic Plan Draw Cool Response at
House Hearing, 64 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1582, July 26, 2002, at
296-97 (quoting USPTO Director James Rogan's statement that "there may be many
former PTO examiners who would love to get a private salary to do patent searches").
145. See House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 91 (statement of Ronald
J. Stern, President, Patent Office Professional Association) ("The patentability
determination can only be as good as the prior art on which that patentability
determination is founded.").
146. See Sherwood et al., supra note 144, at 480 (concluding that full-time patent
examiners are more credible than fixed-fee contractors because contractors "may limit the
time they devote to examinations, thus limiting the extent of their searches").
147. Caveat Inventor: Invention Marketing Scams: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulation and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs,
103d Cong. 16, 44 (1994) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on Invention Promotion Companies]
(statement of Robert G. Lougher, President, Inventors Awareness Group) (presenting a
striking example of a private firm's exploiting misleading search results). Mr. Loucher
testified that he witnessed the firm maintain two separate patent searches for each
inventor, one search suggesting the invention was patentable, while the other suggested it
was unpatentable. Id. at 44. The firm would then choose the search that best fit its needs.
Id.; see also FTC, Consumer Alert: Spotting Sweet-Sounding Promises of Fraudulent
Invention Promotion Firms, July 1997 (warning consumers that "[p]atent searches by
fraudulent invention promotion firms usually are incomplete, conducted in the wrong
category, or unaccompanied by a legal opinion on the results of the search from a patent
attorney"), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/invnalrt.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2003)
148. Berliner, supra note 132, at 416 (admonishing patent practitioners to be wary of a
private vendor's prior art search because the search results may be substandard and
produce results that give their clients the false impression that the invention is patentable).
149. See Sherwood et al., supra note 144, at 480 (concluding that full-time patent
examiners are more credible than fixed-fee contractors because contractors "may limit the
time they devote to examinations, thus limiting the extent of their searches"). Moreover,
patentability searches cost about $1,100, even for search results of questionable value. See
Curtis L. Harrington, Inventive Ideas About Patent Searches, MACHINE DESIGN, Dec. 11,
1997, at 110. However, more comprehensive searches, such as infringement and validity
searches, are more expensive. Id. For example, infringement searches cost between
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exclusive constitutional rights at stake, any negative impact on the prior
art search could infringe the constitutional rights of the patent owner as
well as others excluded from making, using, or selling the invention."'
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines an inherently
governmental function as "a function which is so intimately related to the
public interest as to mandate performance by [g]overnment
employees.' 5 2  Inherently governmental functions include activities
requiring the exercise of discretion or value judgment in making
decisions for the Government.'53 In view of the quasi-judicial nature of
patent examination and the decision-making process inherent to the
prior art search that directly affects the public interest, patent searching
likely qualifies as an inherently governmental function. 54  Thus,
outsourcing the examiner's search to the private sector appears to be
contrary to OMB guidelines and therefore inappropriate.'
$2,000 and $10,000. Id. Also, the extent and quality of a validity search are dependent
upon an analysis of the expected benefits of the search with its cost. Id. In deciding
whether to terminate validity searches, clients continually compare the cost of each step of
the search with the amount of royalty payment they expect to receive. Id. Interestingly,
some foreign patent offices, such as Ecuador's patent office, hire local university
professors to assist in patent examination. See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS
Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 528 (1997). However,
"[t]he quality of the examination will depend on the knowledge, interest and skill of the
professor, who may be happy to earn extra income, but who may not be well versed in
technical examination of patent applications." Id.
150. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (2000); Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to
"secur[e] for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ...
Discoveries." Id. Accordingly, once the patent is granted, the patentee can exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention for twenty years from the filing date of the
patent application. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (2000); see also Lehman, supra note 58,
at 21 ("[T]he patent right goes far beyond the right to prevent another from simply
copying .... [it also] conveys the right to exclude all others from making, selling, and
using the invention for [twenty] years from filing ....").
152. Office of Management & Budget, Circular No. A-76, at 2, Aug. 4, 1983 (Rev.
1999); see also Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 5,
112 Stat. 2382, 2384 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2000)). See generally
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 42 F.L.R.A. No. 31 (1991), at 19-25 (holding that the
OMB Circular A-76 has the force and effect of law because it is a substantive regulation
issued pursuant to statutory authority affecting individual rights and obligations), available
at 1991 WL 207425.
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Conversely, the USPTO has argued that while outsourcing the search
is not an optimal solution,'56 it is nevertheless needed to shift between
twenty and twenty-five percent of the examiner's time toward improving
patent quality and reducing application pendency."' Moreover, an
examiner could perform "a supplemental search" if the examiner
determines a CSS's search has "any kind of faulty strategy behind [it]." '58
A deficient search, however, may not be apparent from a mere
inspection of the search strategy. 9  Indeed, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a private vendor
prematurely terminated a search or whether the search was otherwise
misleading for some inequitable motive.' 60 Even if an examiner
conducted a "supplemental search," it likely would not match the scope
and breadth of a comprehensive patentability search in view of the
examiner's time constraints.16 ' Additionally, even if the expected five to
twenty percent productivity increase were realized by shifting the
.. 162
examiner's efforts away from searching, it is questionable whether such
a modest productivity gain is worth the risk of potentially undermining
the presumption of patent validity by granting patents based on
substandard searches performed by contractors whose primary
motivation is to make money, rather than serve the public interest.
156. See House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 76 ("In a perfect world,
our examiners would also do the searches.").
157. See id.
158. See id. at 77.
159. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-6. According to the USPTO,
the CSS will prepare both a "search abstract" and an international-style search report that
will compare the prior art to the claims. Id. The USPTO concludes that the search report
will save prosecution time by leading to a "quicker meeting of the minds" resulting from
the examiner benefiting from the CSS's prior art analysis and having "a better
appreciation" of claim coverage. Id.
160. See Senate Hearing on Invention Promotion Companies, supra note 147, at 44
(statement of Robert G. Lougher, President, Inventors Awareness Group) (recalling
witnessing an unscrupulous private invention promotion firm having two different patent
searches from which it would choose to best suit its interests-one suggesting the idea was
patentable and the other suggesting it was unpatentable); see also Sherwood et al., supra
note 144, at 480 (stating that full-time patent examiners are more credible than fixed-fee
contractors because contractors "may limit the time they devote to examinations, thus
limiting the extent of their searches"); Grantham, supra note 56, at 9 ("It is unclear how
the PTO would recognize a low quality prior art search if it lacks knowledge of the
accumulated history of the art."). See generally id. at 8 ("Ambiguity ... is the hallmark of
prior art searching.").
161. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. See generally Thomas, supra note
60, at 314 (discussing the time constraints imposed on patent examiners by the USPTO).
162. See House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 76; see also THE 21ST
CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 9.
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B. Legislative Intent Strongly Suggests That Examiners Should Conduct
the Searches
1. The Patent Act of 1836 Established the Examiner's Duty To
"Discover" Previous Inventions
The Patent Act of 1836 established the current examination system
and emphasized that examination was intended to discover previous
• • 163
inventions. Moreover, the Act provided a method to collect the prior
art to facilitate examination.6 4 To this end, Congress appropriated funds
specifically targeted to add "to the knowledge of the office" and acquire
enhanced prior art research facilities.'65  In an 1837 report, Senator
Ruggles emphasized that the examiner must thoroughly investigate "all
that has been known or invented" pertaining to the subject matter of the
invention.'6 Thus, Congress likely intended that examiners conduct the
searches in view of the narrowly targeted appropriation for patent
research, the express statements that the examiner's duties include
searching, and the 165-year tradition of examiners conducting the
searches since passage of the 1836 Act. 6
163. Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, supra note 44, at 99.
164. Id. at 97.
165. Id. at 99.
166. See id. at 216 (quoting Senator Ruggles in an 1837 report made less than one year
after passage of the Patent Act of 1836).
167. See generally supra text accompanying notes 38-39. Such apparent congressional
intent suggests that the statutory term "examination" in 35 U.S.C. § 131 inherently
comprises the examiner conducting the prior art search. See generally supra text
accompanying notes 38-39. It is well settled that if congressional intent underlying the
statute in question is clear, then both the agency and the courts must defer to Congress'
position. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). However, if Congress is silent or ambiguous, then the court must defer to the
agency's reasonable interpretation. Id. A court may not substitute its own construction
for the agency's reasonable interpretation, even if the court would have reached a
different conclusion. Id. at 844. Thus, under Chevron, if Congress intended for the
statutory term "examination" to include both the patentability determination and the
prior art search, both the courts and the agency would have to defer to the position
consistent with Congress' intent. See id. However, even if Congress was completely silent
or ambiguous regarding its underlying intent, courts could hold that any change in the
USPTO's interpretation of "examination" (i.e., from examiners conducting the search for
over 165 years to examiners not performing the search) would be unreasonable under
Chevron. See id. While "[a]n initial agency interpretation is not carved in stone," the
agency must nevertheless justify its change with a "reasoned analysis." Id. at 863-64; see
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).
Moreover, the determination of whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable turns on
the compatibility of the inquiry with the underlying congressional purposes informing the
measure. Con'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Here, the agency's reasoned analysis for changing its interpretation of "examination"
presumably is set forth in the Strategic Plan, namely the expected benefits to quality,
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2. Legislative Intent Underlying the Patent & Trademark Authorization
Act of 2002 Does Not Reasonably Suggest Outsourcing the Prior Art
Search to Private Vendors
In the report accompanying H.R. 2047, the Judiciary Committee
directed the USPTO to eliminate any examiner's tasks that can be
handled by "administrative staff."' '6  Additionally, the committee
suggested that the agency rely on earlier search and examination results
solely from the EPO for efficiency reasons. 69 The USPTO was also
instructed to consider using contractors to assist examiners in performing
"administrative tasks., 170 The Committee, however, did not define the
ambiguous phrase, "administrative tasks.''.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume Congress' intent would be
consistent with the OMB mandate requiring that governmental functions
be performed by government employees.72 OMB has listed numerous
examples of commercial activities suitable for outsourcing.'73 The listed
tasks, however, are merely ministerial and are not reasonably analogous
pendency, and cost-effectiveness. See THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note
5, at 3. Despite these laudable goals, it is unclear whether courts would view this
justification as a sufficiently reasoned analysis to pass muster under State Farm and
Chevron. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863; State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57. Courts might view the
potential detrimental impact on the presumption of validity, certainty, and the public
perception of the patent system as far outweighing the expected quality, pendency, and
cost-effectiveness benefits, if any, realized by the agency. Moreover, the underlying
congressional purpose informing the measure is the establishment of an examination
system that grants presumptively valid patents whose validity ultimately depends on
thorough prior art searches. See supra Part I.A. As noted in Part III.B.2 infra, Congress
narrowly limited its directive to the USPTO to explore taking advantage of search results
only from the EPO. See H.R. REP. No. 107-190, at 6 (2001). Indeed, Congress was
noticeably silent about using searches from the private sector. Therefore, if legally
challenged, outsourcing prior art searches to private vendors may not be viewed as
reasonably consistent with Congress' purpose and therefore could be held unreasonable
under Chevron.




172. See Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76, at 2, Aug. 4,1983 (Rev.
1999); see also Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that OMB
Circular A-76 is relevant to determine congressional intent underlying statutes); Nat'l
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting
congressional endorsement of OMB Circular A-76 in a Senate report to retain "inherently
governmental" functions in-house); Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 801 (6th Cir.
1991) (noting the congressional mandate that the Defense Department follow OMB
Circular A-76 in its outsourcing process).
173. Office of Management & Budget, Circular No. A-76, at Attachment A, Aug. 4,
1983 (Rev. 1999).
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to a prior art search upon which a quasi-judicial patentability decision is
based. 174
Furthermore, while Congress mentioned relying on earlier search and
examination results from the EPO, Congress refrained from suggesting
similar reliance on searches from commercial vendors . Thus, by
negative implication, Congress expressed disapproval of such
outsourcing. 6 Instead, Congress merely advised the USPTO to consider
outsourcing "administrative tasks" to contract personnel.1 77 In view of
Congress' narrow directive, the USPTO's apparent interpretation of
"administrative tasks" to include prior art searching arguably oversteps
the scope of the mandate.11
174. Id. The categories of tasks listed in the circular that are most relevant are: (1)
"Office and Administrative Services," (2) "Special Studies and Analyses," and (3) "Other
Services." Id. The tasks listed in the first category are limited to ministerial and clerical
functions. Id. Under the second category, the closest tasks are "scientific data studies"
and "legal/litigation studies." Id. Even with the broadest reasonable interpretation of
such studies, it is unlikely that a prior art search upon which patentability depends would
be envisioned by a "legal/litigation" or "scientific data" study. Litigation studies and
scientific data studies are predominantly statistical in nature and, unlike patent
examination, do not require quasi-judicial analysis and opinions affecting the public
interest. See generally supra notes 110- 111 and accompanying text. The final category,
"Other Services," does not contemplate an activity reasonably related to a prior art
search. Office of Management & Budget, Circular No. A-76, at Attachment A, Aug. 4,
1983 (Rev. 1999). Therefore, interpreting "administrative tasks" in light of the circular
strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to have the agency outsource the prior art
search to commercial vendors. Also, the statutory exceptions to "inherently
[g]overnmental functions" provided in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of
1998 do not reasonably apply to a prior art search upon which a patentability
determination depends. See Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-270 § 5(2)(C), 112 Stat. 2382, 2385 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501 note
(2000)). The closest exception is for "gathering information for or providing advice,
opinions, recommendations, or ideas to [f]ederal [g]overnment officials." Id. However,
"gathering information" would not reasonably contemplate a prior art search for a quasi-
judicial patentability determination in view of the decision-making function inherent to
the search. Moreover, as will be explained in Part III.D infra, the search and the
examination functions are inextricably intertwined and cannot be reasonably separated.
175. See H.R. REP. No. 107-190, at 6 (2001).
176. See id. In fact, Rep. John Conyers of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee expressed concern with the
USPTO's outsourcing proposal. See House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at
84 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Mich.). Rep. Conyers concluded that
"conducting thorough searches is an integral part of the PTO's examination role." Id.
Moreover, he expressed uncertainty regarding "how [Congress and the USPTO] would
ensure that every search on every application was thoroughly done by the contractors."
Id.
177. H.R. REP. No. 107-190, at 6 (2001).
178. This conclusion holds despite previous efforts on the part of various government
agencies to outsource legal services, including patent searching. For example, the
Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of Health &
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Nevertheless, proponents of outsourcing searches have argued that it is
a viable option for several reasons.'79 First, because applicants frequently
use private search firms to assess the prior art before filing patent
applications, outsourcing the search merely institutionalizes that• 180
practice. Because the quality and extent of private searches vary
widely among vendors, however, some commercial "state-of-the-art"
searches are of questionable value. 8" Secondly, outsourcing proponents
note that the EPO had at one time employed a split search and
examination process."' However, the EPO has recognized the problems
inherent in such a system and is currently abandoning this approach
through implementation of BEST.183 Proponents of outsourcing searches
further argue that U.S. patents are sometimes later invalidated due to
prior art found by private search firms.'8 Such "validity searches" are
extremely exhaustive investigations conducted primarily for litigation
purposes, span several weeks, and consider every possible relevant
publication - no matter how remote.' In addition, such searches are
Human Services, and the Department of the Interior have all outsourced patent searches
in connection with legal services. See William V. Luneburg, Contracting By the Federal
Government for Legal Services: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 399, 471-77 app. A (1988). Such general, "state-of-the-art" patent searches,
however, are not necessarily commensurate with the comprehensive search conducted by
a patent examiner upon which a quasi-judicial patentability decision depends. See supra
notes 132-134 and accompanying text. Moreover, an applicant does not have a duty to
conduct a prior art search at all, much less a search of sufficient rigor and thoroughness
upon which an examiner's patentability decision depends. See MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 15, § 609, at 600-718 ("There is no requirement that
an applicant for a patent make a patentability search."); see also FMC Corp. v. Hennessy
Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("As a general rule, there is no duty to
conduct a prior art search, and thus there is no duty to disclose art of which an applicant
could have been aware.").
179. See, e.g., House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 126 (statement of
Joseph L. Ebersole, Counsel, Coalition for Patent and Trademark Information
Dissemination).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 144.
182. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 126 (statement of Joseph L.
Ebersole, Counsel, Coalition for Patent and Trademark Information Dissemination).
183. See Part II.A supra.
184. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 126 (statement of Joseph L.
Ebersole, Counsel, Coalition for Patent and Trademark Information Dissemination).
185. See S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 14 (noting that the
USPTO cannot undertake a "validity search" of several weeks' duration, which includes
an inspection of every possible publication, no matter how remote). In fact, clients are
only willing to spend limited sums on patentability searches; however, they are willing to
spend thousands of dollars for validity searches. See Welsh, supra note 9, at 77. Indeed,
the time spent conducting a patentability search is only a fraction of the time spent
conducting a validity search. See id.
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neither practical nor expected by a government agency with limited
resources and an ever-increasing application backlog.'
8 6
C. What Will Be the Effect on the Validity Presumption and Public
Confidence in Patents Searched by a Decertified CSS?
In his testimony to Congress, a representative of the IP Law Section of
the ABA noted, "If the [e]xaminer does not do the search, it will not be
done as well, which would weaken the presumption of . . .validity."' 87
Concern has also been expressed regarding the effect on the validity
presumption for patents searched by a CSS that is later decertified by the
USPTO."8 The situation appears analogous to obtaining a degree from a
university, which, although accredited at the time of graduation, later
loses its accreditation. Although the degree was conferred by an
accredited institution, the negative impact of the institution's subsequent
loss of accreditation would inevitably affect the perceived value of the
degree.
A similar type of negative public perception could taint an otherwise
valid patent searched by a later-decertified CSS.8 9 If the presumption of
validity is weakened, the patent's certainty is also weakened, a fact which
can ultimately affect investor confidence and investment in new
technology.' Thus, even if a patent's presumption of validity is legally
unaffected if searched by a later-decertified CSS, the negative public
perception attached to such patents could have a detrimental impact on
investor confidence in those patents.'9
D. The Search and Examination Functions Are Inextricably Intertwined
The prior art search process necessarily involves a substantive
examination. For example, an examiner's statutory obviousness
186. S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 14.
187. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Charles P.
Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law Section, American Bar Association).
188. Id. at 49-50.
189. Id. at 49 (concluding that the public would have little confidence in a private
sector search firm tasked with protecting the public interest).
190. See id. at 44; see also Lehman, supra note 58, at 21 ("[l]nvestors who provide
much-needed capital to innovators on the basis of patents act under the assumption that
patents granted in the United States have been properly examined and can be presumed
to be valid in the event of a challenge.").
191. See Lehman, supra note 58, at 21 ("The quality and trustworthiness of the
examination system is at the core of investor confidence in many high-tech companies.").
Cf. House Hearing on Patent Quality, supra note 9, at 26 (statement of David Martin,
Chief Executive Officer of M-CAM, Inc.) (noting that investors in one company lost over
$330 million in one day due to its reliance on U.S. patents later found invalid because of
overlooked prior art during examination).
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determination' 92 relies heavily upon the iterative decision-making process
that occurs during a prior art search.9 3 When a certain feature becomes
important during a search, "the [e]xaminer can adjust the search
accordingly to find the best art with respect to that element.,
194
Moreover, when formulating obviousness rejections, U.S. examiners
must find each element of an inventive combination in the prior art and a
motivation to combine various features - a requirement unique to U.S.
patent law.' 95 While a private searcher may find individual claimed
features, the searcher may not find the subtle teachings to combine the
features critical to a sound obviousness decision.' 96 Indeed, many private
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). In determining obviousness, examiners must: (1)
determine the scope and content of the prior art; (2) ascertain the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue; (3) resolve the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4)
evaluate evidence of secondary considerations suggesting nonobviousness. See Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Moreover, examiners must apply 35 U.S.C. § 103 in
light of the following factors: (1) the claimed invention must be considered in its entirety;
(2) the references must be evaluated as a whole and must suggest the obviousness of
making the combination; (3) the references must be viewed without hindsight afforded by
the claimed invention; and (4) obviousness must be viewed under the standard of a
reasonable expectation of success. Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136, 1143 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
193. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Charles P.
Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law Section, American Bar Association).
194. Id.
195. Id. See generally In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("This court
has identified three possible sources for a motivation to combine references: the nature of
the problem to be solved, the teachings of the prior art, and the knowledge of persons of
ordinary skill in the art.").
196. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Charles P.
Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law Section, American Bar Association). Also, the
Federal Circuit has held that a "trend" in the prior art may be a significant factor in
obviousness determinations. See Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH,
139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In fact, a trend in the art may provide sufficient
suggestion to modify a prior art reference in accordance with the trend. Id. Because
examiners have unparalleled experience searching and examining patent applications in
specialized technology areas on a daily basis, examiners would be particularly cognizant of
trends in their respective arts. See infra Part IV.A. See generally supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, deciding whether it is obvious to combine references
involves a factual inquiry that must be "thorough and searching." McGinley v. Franklin
Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This factual inquiry is dependent
upon the level of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains. Id. at 1351. The
court further explained:
Where the level of skill is high, one may assume a keener appreciation of
nuances taught by the prior art. Similarly, appreciation of the differences
between the claims in suit and the scope of prior art references-a matter itself
informed by the operative level of skill in the art-informs the question of
whether to combine prior art references.
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searchers have little or no knowledge of patent law. 117  Even if one
assumes that private searchers are aware of the statutory obviousness
standards, under the Strategic Plan, private firms would not actually
decide patentability with the public interest in mind.98 In addition, it is
unlikely that private firms would be privy to certain evidence in the
record, including compelling arguments and data, which could suggest
the impropriety of combining certain references.'
Furthermore, the very nature of ex parte prosecution 00 is inherently
.. 201
biased in favor of the applicant, which renders outsourcing searches to
private vendors inappropriate. Continued reiteration of views favorable
to the applicant during ex parte prosecution inevitably pressures
Id. Thus, the level of skill in the art and the appreciation of the differences between the
claimed subject matter and the scope of the prior art are factors that directly influence the
question of whether to combine references. See id. As noted by one commentator,
private searchers tend to be generalists while examiners are generally accepted as experts
in their respective arts. See Grantham, supra note 56, at 8 (characterizing the private
sector searcher as a generalist who "looks for broad teachings based on a limited
disclosure," whereas an examiner is recognized as an expert who has acquired a "feel for
patentability based on awareness of the historical aspect of specific art"). Therefore,
unlike an examiner, a generalist may not have the requisite skill in the art or knowledge of
its evolution to appreciate its nuances fully. See id. As a result, a private searcher may not
possess the skill needed to decide whether it would be obvious to combine certain
references while conducting a prior art search. See id. Consequently, in the process of
searching, the private searcher may simply dismiss, and therefore not retrieve, patents that
an examiner would find critical to justify combining certain references. See generally
Welsh, supra note 9, at 90 (noting that "many searches are merely 'farmed out' to
individuals having little, or no, true knowledge of [patent law]").
197. See Welsh, supra note 9, at 89-90.
198. See generally Lindsey v. United States, 778 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting that the examiner's patentability determination necessarily involves decision-
making that weighs "considerations of social, economic, and political policy"); see also S.
JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 26 (noting that because there is no
general advocate for the public interest, "[t]he examiner must act as a court of original
jurisdiction and at the same time protect the public interest against the grant of invalid
patents as well as patents of unduly broad scope"); Smith, supra note 122, at 169 ("[The
examiner's] client is the public at large.").
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000) (mandating that patent applications be kept
confidential by the USPTO). Moreover, examiners must evaluate evidence in the record
of secondary considerations suggesting nonobviousness. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). In view of the confidentiality of this evidence, it would
therefore likely be known only by the patent applicant, the applicant's representative, and
the USPTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000). See generally In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[Pjatentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a
preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument.").
200. See supra note 29 (describing the ex parte procedure).
201. See S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 26-27.
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examiners to allow the application.'02  This inherent bias is
counterbalanced, however, by the challenge of discovering the best prior
art and is a source of genuine satisfaction for examiners.2 3 Examiners
routinely meet this challenge by exercising their best efforts to discover
compelling references that disclose the claimed limitations. Moreover,
the check and balance function of the examiner's search neutralizes any
potential misrepresentations made by the applicant about the scope and
201content of the prior art. Without the check and balance system, the
inherent bias favoring the applicant might unduly influence the
examiner's decision to allow an otherwise unpatentable invention.
Additionally, the EPO's BEST program strongly suggests that
searching the prior art is an essential component of examination. 20 6 In
1993, the EPO abandoned a split search and examination system in favor
of a combined system.20' To date, BEST's demonstrated success has
motivated the EPO to fully implement the program between 2004 and
2006.' o8 Thus, the success of the combined system strongly suggests that
combining the search and examining functions is fundamental to efficient
and consistent examination.2 9
202. Id.; see also Lemley, supra note 24, at 1496 n.3 (arguing that examiners "have a
strong incentive to issue patents to persistent applicants, rather than to continue rejecting
the applications").
203. See S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 27. But see Wegner,
supra note 73, at 6 n.3 ("Historically, one of the negatives of the job of a [platent
[ejxaminer has been the large amount of time required for searching for prior art, a mind-
numbing task of minimal intellectual stimulation, at best.").
204. S. JUDICIARY COMM. STUDY No. 29, supra note 47, at 27.
205. See Dienner, supra note 15, at 153-54 (noting that the examiner's own search
functions as a "check upon the applicant's representations as to the prior art"); see also
Berliner, supra note 132, at 416 (warning that a substandard search performed by a private
searcher may give the applicant a "false impression" that the invention is patentable).
206. Marandon, supra note 80, §§ 1-2.1; see also House Hearing on USPTO Reform,
supra note 9, at 50 (statement of Charles P. Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law
Section, American Bar Association) ("The best testament against separating the search
function and an examination function is the fact the European Patent Office, which has
had such a system for years, has recently decided to abandon it."); McDonald, supra note
87, at 467 (noting that the BEST project "has been expanded with positive results").
207. See Marandon, supra note 80, § 1.
208. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
209. But see JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (JPO), The Roles of Bodies Supporting the
Development of Industrial Property System, at 20-21, 34 (describing the JPO's
establishment of the Industrial Property Cooperation Center (IPCC) as a search
organization to assist the agency by conducting prior art searches on behalf of examiners),
available at http://www.apic.jiii.or.jp/facility/text/6-02.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter JPO, Supporting the Development of Industrial Property System]. While the
official Japanese examination guidelines state that the examiner should carry out the prior
art search, JPO examiners nevertheless rely on the IPCC's search results. See JPO,
Examination Guidelines, supra note 73, at 3-5. Although originally created to build and
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It could be argued that the split search and examination system
worked satisfactorily for the EPO prior to BEST.""0 Thus, according to
this contrary view, the EPO adopted BEST merely to increase
productivity and efficiency, not to improve search quality. BEST was
implemented, however, with search quality enhancements in mind.21 ' A
noted advantage of BEST is the elimination of the inevitable
inconsistencies encountered when multiple examiners are involved in the
examination process.212 For example, BEST reduces the risk "that a
substantive examiner will cite an additional document not cited by the
search examiner, 213 and eliminates any chance of a "sudden divergence
of opinion" between the search and substantive examiners.14  This
benefit enhances search quality. Additionally, BEST eliminates the
possibility that the substantive examiner might view the search
examiner's work as inadequate and simply dismiss the search examiner's
prior art or analysis. 21 5 When the substantive examiner also performs the
search, however, the cited prior art will inevitably match the substantive
examiner's reasoning and analysis.
216
E. The Practical Consequences of Outsourcing the Prior Art Search Could
Actually Diminish the Efficiency Benefits Sought To Be Achieved by the
Strategic Plan
Even if it were legally appropriate to outsource the prior art search,
the patent system could suffer adverse practical consequences. For
example, substantial prosecution delays and additional costs could result
from examiners' increased use of Rule 105 to obtain additional
maintain a search database and indexing system, the IPCC was designated in 1990 as a
full-fledged search organization to assist Japanese examiners in view of JPO's "budgetary
and organizational limitations." JPO, Supporting the Development of Industrial Property
System, supra, at 20, 21; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-9 (noting
that the IPCC conducts over 100,000 searches annually for the JPO and consists of
industry professionals rather than former examiners); Brenda Sandburg, PTO's
Destination: Silicon Valley, RECORDER, June 29, 1999, at 6 (alluding to the Strategic Plan's
outsourcing proposal by suggesting that the USPTO would consider the JPO's practice of
contracting out some of its searching).
210. See supra note 209 (discussing the quality of the Japanese split search and
examination procedure).
211. Marandon, supra note 80, § 2.
212. Id. § 2.4.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 15, §
704.01, at 700-06 (noting that while full faith and credit should be given to a previous
examiner's work, an examiner should not defer to the previous examiner if "there is a
clear error in the previous action or knowledge of other prior art.")
216. See Marandon, supra note 80, § 2.4.
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information deemed "reasonably necessary" for examination.2t7
Currently, examiners rarely invoke Rule 105 because its use is governed
by policies established by each USPTO Technology Center."' Typically,
the USPTO limits the use of Rule 105 to applications that disclose
technology not readily found in patents, but more likely to appear in
commercial databases.1 9
Therefore, if required to rely on private-vendor searches for
patentability decisions, any examiner, regardless of technology area,
could routinely invoke Rule 105.220 If an examiner believed that the
commercial prior art search failed to meet the minimum quality
threshold for proper examination, the examiner could simply invoke
Rule 105." ' While arguably such a system would enhance search quality,
it is unclear whether any search quality enhancements would justify the
222practical consequences. Such a system might impose delays in
prosecution 23 and increase applicants' costs in the event that an examiner
required additional searching.
217. See Thomas, supra note 124, at 749-50.
218. Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,604, 54,634
(Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts 1, 3, 5, & 10). But see Thomas, supra note
124, at 749-50 (suggesting that Rule 105 is used sparingly because to do otherwise would
require expending scarce resources and would be repugnant to the examiner's incentive
structure).
219. Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,604, 54,633-35
(Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts 1, 3, 5, & 10); see also Thomas, supra note
124, at 749 ("Few patent attorneys have faced a Rule 105 request because examiners
appear reluctant to make them.").
220. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2002); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE, supra note 15, § 704.1 1(b), at 700-08.
221. See Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 Fed. Reg. at 54,633
(noting that the use of Rule 105 by USPTO employees is encouraged "so that the Office
can perform the best quality examination possible"); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2002);
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-12 (noting that examiners may use their
authority under Rule 105 to obtain supplemental information from the applicant when a
supplemental search is needed in view of claim amendments or omission of material cites);
37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2002); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 15, §
704.11(b), at 700-08.
222. See Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 Fed. Reg. at 54,634
(suggesting the negative consequences of allowing proposed Rule 105).
223. See id. (noting that one objection to proposed Rule 105 was that it would "slow
the examination process").
224. See generally Lemley, supra note 24, at 1510 (estimating that "requiring prior art
searches would add between $8,000 and $10,000 to the cost of patent prosecution in most
cases"). But see Kent Hoover, Inventors Fight Outsourcing Searches for New Patents, Bus.
J. TAMPA BAY, July 29, 2002 (estimating the fee for hiring a private search firm to be
$1,000), available at http://tampabay.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stories/2002/07/29/story6.
html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003). But cf House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9,
at 127 (statement of Joseph L. Ebersole, Counsel, Coalition for Patent and Trademark
Information Dissemination) (arguing that outsourcing searches could reduce costs to the
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In addition, an examiner who relies on outsourced searches might
depend more heavily on "official notice" as a matter of practicality.
25
Currently, an examiner may take official notice "of facts beyond the
record which . . . are capable of such instant and unquestionable
demonstration as to defy dispute., 226 Therefore, if from experience, an
examiner believes that pertinent prior art is lacking from the commercial
search, an examiner might take official notice of the omission rather than
require the applicant to provide a reference. Official notice would be a
more expedient measure compared to imposing additional burdens on
the applicant under Rule 105.227 Recent Federal Circuit decisions,
228however, disfavor official notice. Consequently, if examiners
increasingly resort to official notice, their patentability decisions may
frequently be reversed on appeal.
IV. A THREE-PRONGED ALTERNATIVE TO OUTSOURCING
Despite the aforementioned problems with outsourcing prior art
searches, contracting out certain limited search activities to private
vendors has promise. Used in concert with the examiner's expertise in
searching patents, the expertise of a CSS in searching non-patent
literature could greatly enhance and complement the examiner's efforts,
resulting in a more comprehensive search and, ultimately, a stronger
patent. Accordingly, the following prior art search regimen for every
application is suggested: (1) examiners should possess the ultimate
responsibility to search all prior art, including U.S. and foreign patents;
(2) a CSS would be utilized in every case with the responsibility to search
USPTO by taking advantage of private sector investment in search system improvements,
thereby enabling the USPTO to redirect its funding for other purposes).
225. Lance Leonard Barry, Did You Ever Notice? Official Notice in Rejections, 81 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 129, 131 (1999) (justifying the examiner's use of official
notice because it enables "the examiner to use time efficiently to make a speedy and just
determination of issues . . . [and] . . . free[s] the examiner from having to spend
unnecessary time finding a reference to prove the existence of a fact well known at the
time of an invention").
226. In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A. 1970). But see In re Eynde, 480 F.2d
1364, 1370 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("The facts constituting the state of the art are normally
subject to the possibility of rational disagreement among reasonable men and are not
amenable to the taking of [judicial] notice.").
227. See Barry, supra note 225, at 131 (justifying the examiner's use of official notice
for greater efficiency and practicality).
228. See Thomas, supra note 124, at 753 (noting that "[r]ecent Federal Circuit case law
suggests that the USPTO may have to reduce its reliance upon official notice"); see also
House Hearing on Patent Quality, supra note 9, at 23 (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan,
Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer, & Murphy, LLP) (noting that examiners rarely invoke
official notice because the applicant can negate its substance by simply challenging the
examiner to produce evidence supporting his assertion).
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non-patent literature; and (3) all applications should have an automated
search performed, utilizing comprehensive, state-of-the-art text,
linguistics, and image-analysis capabilities.
A. The U.S. Patent Examiner Is Best Suited To Conduct the Patent Search
According to the IP Law Section of the ABA, U.S. examiners1/,229
"perform the best, highest quality searches in the world." This search
expertise stems largely from examiners' highly specialized knowledge
and experience,2 0 which span over 1200 technology classifications.2 1 The
229. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Charles P.
Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law Section, American Bar Association); see also
Sherwood et al., supra note 144, at 480 ("[Platent office examiners offer a greater
likelihood of high-quality examination [than outside contractors] because they have been
trained to conduct examinations, and it is the only work they do."). Moreover, full-time
patent examiners have a higher level of credibility than outside contractors because
contractors "will be only as good as their familiarity with search techniques and their
access to the world's body of scientific and technical information." Id. But see Lemley,
supra note 24, at 1528 (noting that examiners "regularly miss the most relevant prior art");
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-9 (concluding that when the Office of
Patent Quality Review (OPQR) needs to reopen an application to make a prior art
rejection, over fifty percent of such occurrences were due to the discovery of new prior art
by reviewers who are generalists); House Hearing on Patent Quality, supra note 9, at 61
(statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law
Association) ("[E]xaminers sometimes don't find the best prior art, and sometimes when
they do, their judgments are [a] little bit short"); Wegner, supra note 64, at 337-38
(concluding that the European search is "the best in the world" in view of the "brilliant"
searches performed by the treaty-based corps of EPO career examiners).
230. See Welsh, supra note 9, at 80 (stating that "[e]xaminers ... are experts in the
art"); see also House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 89 (statement of Ronald
J. Stern, President, Patent Office Professional Association) ("[A]s an examiner continues
to search in a particular technology area, the examiner becomes more and more familiar
with the prior art in that technology" and they develop "such a level of expertise that they
are regarded as experts in their technologies both within and outside the USPTO."). Cf.
Sherwood et al., supra note 144, at 480 (concluding that because few people are
acquainted with more than one field of technology, a competent examination system
requires at least one examiner for each technical field, thus requiring a minimum of 200
examiners to examine all technology areas adequately). But see Grantham, supra note 56,
at 9 (concluding that the USPTO is gradually losing its "expert edge" resulting from the
agency's increased emphasis on faster application processing and text search techniques).
Moreover, the retirement of "old school" examiners with extensive accumulated
knowledge of the art is diminishing institutional expertise. Id. While much of the
evidence is anecdotal, there appears to be a perception among some public searchers of a
general decline in examiner search expertise. See, e.g., Randy Rabin, If You Come to the
USPTO to Work, Bring Your Own Desk, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, May 2002, at 60. Randy
Rabin, a professional patent searcher, observes:
In years past, consulting an examiner for help on a search typically led him or her
to instantly point to appropriate subclasses, and often a visit to the shoes [patent
files] to see the very patents brought to mind. More recently, searchers who
regularly consult examiners have commented on what they sense as a loss of
expertise on the part of examiners. Now, an examiner turns 90 degrees to his
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volume and scope of examiner expertise encompass the entire spectrum
of human inventive effort."' Such breadth and volume of technological
expertise are unlikely to be matched by any single private 
company.233
Also, the USPTO is currently more likely to find documents thatS 234
the agency itself generates. During prosecution, examiners can draw
computer, sometimes appearing as perplexed as his visitor, and begins to
perform what might be a duplicate of the text search his hopeful visitor has
already tried.
Id.
231. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 128, at 92 (noting the USPTO's classification
scheme has over 1200 categories); see also House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note
9, at 126 (statement of Joseph L. Ebersole, Counsel, Coalition for Patent and Trademark
Information Dissemination) (noting that the USPTO "has the greatest single
concentration of technical expertise that exists anywhere in the world"); Cockburn, supra
note 26, at 4 (noting that the USPTO receives "more certified mail each day than any
other single organization in the world" and "is staffed by over 3000 patent examiners" and
stating that the work allocation at the USPTO promotes specialization and that individual
examiners "may be responsible for nearly all of the applications within specific classes or
subclasses"). But see Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-9 (noting that, unlike
examiners, reviewers from the Office of Patent Quality Review (OPQR) are generalists
who have shown they can search as well as examiners, evidenced by the fact that over fifty
percent of applications that were reopened due to claim rejections over prior art were due
to the discovery of new prior art found by OPQR reviewers).
232. See House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 89 (statement of Ronald
J. Stern, President, Patent Office Professional Association) ("Where else can one find a
single collection of engineers and scientists with the collective expertise to examine
anything from safety pins to atom bombs; from fishing lures to genetically engineered
plants and animals?"). But see Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at Q-9 (noting
that in Japan, the Industrial Property Cooperation Center (IPCC) conducts over 100,000
searches per year for examiners and consists of industry professionals-not former
examiners-thereby suggesting that a similar large, untapped resource of private industry
professionals exists in the United States who could conduct searches for U.S. examiners).
233. See House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 89 (statement of Ronald
J. Stern, President, Patent Office Professional Association) ("The USPTO represents the
single largest accumulation of technological expertise in the federal government."); David
Testardi, Comments on 21st Century Strategic Plan, at 3 (suggesting that "[t]he Examiners
who work day-in and day-out in a particular technology are the most qualified to perform
the International Search" because, unlike private contractors, examiners possess a greater
depth of technological understanding and historical knowledge of the art that comes from
experience), at http://home.earthlink.net/-datestardi/comments.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2003). In fact, one commentator even proposed the remarkable idea of the USPTO
capitalizing on the search expertise of its examiners by selling fee-based searches to the
public as a profit-generating enterprise. See Harry Jacobson, Commentaria, Official
Searches by Patent Office, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 750, 750-51 (1954). But see House
Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 170 (2002) (statement of Joseph L. Ebersole,
Counsel, Coalition for Patent and Trademark Information Dissemination) (arguing that
while no private sector organization would match the breadth of U.S. examiner expertise,
that mismatch should not be a reason to prohibit outsourcing searches but should merely
be one of the facts considered for certification requirements and training).
234. Allison & Lemley, supra note 128, at 102.
['Vol. 52:761
Preserving the Presumption of Patent Validity
upon their knowledge of patents that they previously examined,
particularly in highly specialized areas.235  Therefore, in view of the
breadth of examiner technological expertise, the strong link between the
search and patentability determination, and the greater likelihood of the
examiner finding relevant patents, the U.S. examiner is best suited to
conduct the patent search.
B. The Use of a CSS Should Be Limited and Should Focus Primarily on
Non-Patent Literature
The CSS search should not be a substitute for an examiner's search.
Instead, the examiner should continue to conduct the entire prior art
search. Thus, the CSS search would serve merely as an enhancement to
the examiner's search.
The limited use of a CSS would be a boon to examiners, particularly
for technologies where the prior art is predominantly non-patent
literature. For example, a CSS's findings could relieve the examiner's
burden of finding inventive features in obscure non-patent documents
and could suggest additional search areas. Moreover, the search results
that a CSS submits to the examiner might serve as a starting point for
finding additional prior art that teaches combining references critical to
obviousness decisions. Such subtle teaching references might not be
236apparent to a CSS searcher. Lastly, the examiner could combine the
CSS's expertise in searching non-patent literature with the examiner's
expertise in searching patents. 27 The combined expertise of examiners
and CSSs would likely result in a more comprehensive search and,
238
ultimately, a stronger patent.
C. Every Application Should Be Subjected to an Automated Search
Tantamount to Data Mining
In addition to the search efforts of the examiner and the CSS, the
USPTO should automatically search every application using the most
effective, state-of-the-art text, linguistics, and image-analysis technology
235. Cockburn, supra note 26, at 9.
236. House Hearing on USPTO Reform, supra note 9, at 49 (statement of Charles P.
Baker, Chair, Intellectual Property Law Section, American Bar Association).
237. See Cockburn, supra note 26, at 6 (noting that the extent to which examiners
search non-patent literature "may be a function of the nature of the technology, maturity
of the field, and the ease with which it can be searched"). But see Allison & Lemley, supra
note 128, at 138 (concluding that computer searching may explain why examiners cite ten
times as much non-patent prior art as they did in the 1970s).
238. See King, supra note 25, at 22 (concluding that if examination quality increases,
the risk of expensive litigation will decrease in view of fewer patents subjected to court
review).
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available."' Such an automated system should include a computerized
analysis of the text and figures of a patent application, an automatic
computerized database search based on that text and image analysis, and
automatic retrieval of the most relevant documents for consideration.
This system would utilize the expertise of both the examiner and the CSS
and take advantage of sophisticated technology to locate automatically
240prior art that is otherwise impossible or impractical to find. Essentially,
the automated search component would be a data mining operation,
maximizing the chance of finding obscure documents not readily found
using conventional search methods. 4t  As technology progresses,
239. See Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines:
Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 607-08
(2002) (proposing that the USPTO utilize the search and pattern recognition capabilities
of computers for searching and prior art analysis); see also Elizabeth D. Liddy & Michael
L. Weiner, Intelligent Text Processing and Intelligence Tradecraft, J. ASS'N FOR GLOBAL
STRATEGIC INFO. (1995), at 7 (concluding that if the patent office had access to a
powerful, linguistically informed search system able to overcome complexities and
ambiguities of language, all applications should be subjected to such a search), available at
http://www.damas.ift.ulaval.ca/-coursIA2/Fichiers/itextpro.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2002)
(on file with author); Thomas, supra note 124, at 757 ("Patent searching should become
increasingly automated and its results presented to the applicant prior to the First Office
Action.").
240. See Liddy & Weiner, supra note 239, at 7. A sufficiently powerful automated
search tool could search "not only newspapers, journals, magazine[s], abstracts, and
bibliographies, but also entire reference books, specialized encyclopedias, and even the
plethora of doctoral dissertations .... These all represent significant amounts of prior art
that we know may exist ... but ha[ve] been heretofore impractical to search." Id.; see also
Lehman, supra note 58, at 23 ("Clearly, what is needed is a single database of all the
relevant existing publications, and an engine superior to anything now in use to search this
database ... [using] artificial intelligence attributes not currently available in the search
technologies employed by the USPTO, the EPO, or the JPO."); Schwartz, supra note 46,
at 808 (arguing that a "mechanized" search will strengthen the presumption of validity
because the extension of the field of search will eliminate the possibility of missing
pertinent art); Thermo King Corp. v. White's Trucking Serv., Inc., 292 F.2d 668, 676 n.l
(5th Cir. 1961) (conceding the impossibility of manually searching the USPTO patent files
effectively and noting the promise of computer-based solutions to aid the agency in its
search efforts). An interesting potential benefit of an automated search is the
simplification of the examiner's task of combining references for obviousness
determinations by automatically finding primary references. See Schwartz, supra note 46,
at 807. But see In re Mines Tire Co., 194 B.R. 23, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (warning
that while computer searching has vast potential, it "can never replace human judgment
and discretion . . . [and] users must learn to recognize its shortcomings . . . [in order to]
achieve the benefits of computer precision without jeopardizing the accuracy of a diligent
human searcher").
241. See generally Peggy Zorn et al., Finding Needles in the Haystack: Mining Meets the
Web, ONLINE, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 17-18 (defining data mining as "analyzing the data in
large databases to identify trends, similarities, and patterns to support managerial decision
making"); Susan Mendelsohn, Patterns Formed by a Single Shot of Malt, INFO. WORLD
REV., Aug. 1, 2000, at 25 (discussing the use of data mining tools in patent research); E.E.
Mazier, Insurers Look To Strike Gold with Data Mining Technology, NAT'L
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increasingly powerful search and analysis capabilities will continually
improve the automated search component.
V. CONCLUSION
Outsourcing the examiner's prior art search to commercial vendors is
fraught with legal and practical problems. Indeed, a patent examiner's
decision-making function is so dependent upon the prior art search
results that they essentially dictate the outcome of the patentability
242decision. In addition, in view of the exclusive constitutional and
statutory rights at stake,2 4 ' any negative impact on the prior art search to
maximize profits could infringe the constitutional rights of the patent
owner, as well as others excluded from making, using, or selling the
invention.4
Moreover, the decision-making functions of both the patentability
determination and prior art search are inextricably intertwined and
cannot be reasonably separated. Thus, the prior art search is an
inherently governmental function that cannot be appropriately
outsourced. Contracting out this critical activity would seriously erode a
patent's presumption of validity and ultimately jeopardize public
confidence in the patent system. Outsourcing limited search functions to
private vendors, such as non-patent literature searches, however, might
serve as an excellent complement to the examiner's overall prior art
search.
Therefore, an ideal system would combine: (1) examiners conducting
the search, making use of their expertise in searching U.S. and foreign
patents; (2) private vendors specializing in non-patent literature,
augmenting the examiner's search; and (3) an automatic data mining
operation effectively searching obscure areas otherwise impossible or
impractical to search. Such a system would utilize the examiner's patent
searching expertise, the private vendor's non-patent literature searching
UNDERWRITER: PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Sept. 30,
2002, at 10 (reporting on the insurance industry's positive results achieved with data
mining and characterizing the technique as a productive way to process enormous
amounts of information "that can then be validated through other means").
242. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
243. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.SC. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (2000); Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
244. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to "secur[e] for limited Times to..
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective... Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. Accordingly, once a patent is granted, the patentee can exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention for twenty years from the filing date of the patent
application. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (2000).
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expertise, and powerful, state-of-the-art search technology.2 45 This three-
pronged, synergistic approach would likely ensure the most
comprehensive and effective search practicable, preserving the
presumption of validity for each granted patent.
245. See Cottone, supra note 134, at 235-36 (concluding that prior art search
effectiveness is enhanced by using many search approaches rather than increasing the
amount of effort expended on a single approach); see also House Hearing on Patent
Quality, supra note 9, at 68 (statement of James F. Cottone, President, National
Intellectual Property Researchers Association) (concluding that to most effectively find
patents, "automated searching and manual searching must exist side-by-side").
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